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1 
ARTICLES 
 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT UNDER 
THE MICROSCOPE 
By Mike Koehler* 
 
For most of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s history, key decisions 
concerning its scope and enforcement were made behind closed doors 
around conference room tables in Washington, D.C.  The FCPA took on a 
life of its own and, in many instances, the statute came to mean whatever 
the DOJ or SEC could get putative corporate FCPA defendants (mindful of 
the consequences of actual prosecuted charges) to agree to behind those 
closed doors.  However, as the enforcement agencies continued to push the 
envelope on enforcement theories and practices, and as the DOJ brought 
more individual FCPA enforcement actions, including through 
manufactured sting operations, business entities and individuals alike 
began to openly fight back.  While many FCPA enforcement decisions and 
procedures remain opaque, 2011 witnessed the most intense year of public 
scrutiny in the FCPA’s history.  This Article (i) provides an overview of 
2011 FCPA enforcement and discusses certain problematic enforcement 
trends, and (ii) highlights how in 2011 the FCPA was subjected to the most 
meaningful public scrutiny in its history.  FCPA enforcement trends and 
scrutiny demonstrate that as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth year, basic 
legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope, and 
effectiveness of the FCPA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For most of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s (“FCPA”) history, 
key decisions concerning its scope and enforcement were made behind 
closed doors around conference room tables in Washington, D.C.  The 
FCPA took on a life of its own and, in many instances, the statute came to 
mean whatever the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) could get putative corporate FCPA 
defendants (mindful of the consequences of actual prosecuted charges) to  
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agree to behind those closed doors.
1
  However, as the enforcement agencies 
continued to push the envelope on enforcement theories and practices, and 
as the DOJ brought more individual FCPA enforcement actions, including 
through manufactured sting operations, business entities and individuals 
began to openly fight back.  While many FCPA enforcement decisions and 
procedures remain opaque, 2011 witnessed the most intense year of public 
scrutiny in the FCPA’s history. 
Part I of this Article contains an overview of 2011 FCPA enforcement 
and highlights four enforcement trends:  (i) the magnitude and quantity of 
enforcement actions against foreign companies and foreign nationals and 
how this contributes to a U.S. foreign bribery surplus; (ii) reliance on 
corporate voluntary disclosures in bringing enforcement actions and how 
this contributes to a thriving and growing FCPA industry; (iii) extensive 
use of alternative resolution vehicles in resolving enforcement actions and 
how this contributes to both under-prosecution of egregious instances of 
corporate bribery and over-prosecution of business conduct; and (iv) the 
lack of individual prosecutions in most corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions and how this reflects on the quality of the related corporate 
enforcement action. 
Part II of this Article highlights that in 2011, the FCPA was subjected 
to the most meaningful public scrutiny in its history.  This scrutiny of the 
FCPA and FCPA enforcement came from multiple directions:  Congress, 
the judiciary, and others such as academics, the press, and public interest 
groups.  The FCPA is a fundamentally sound statute that was passed by 
Congress in 1977 to prohibit certain payments to a narrow category of 
recipients comprised of traditional foreign government officials performing 
official or public functions.  However, this scrutiny demonstrates that as the 
FCPA nears its thirty-fifth year, basic legal and policy questions remain as 
to the purpose, scope, and effectiveness of the FCPA and FCPA 
 
* Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law.  Professor Koehler’s 
FCPA expertise and views are informed by a decade of legal practice experience at a 
leading international law firm.  The issues covered in this Article, current as of January 16, 
2012, assume the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the FCPA as well as 
FCPA enforcement (including the role of the DOJ and SEC in enforcing the FCPA and the 
resolution vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA inquiries).  Interested readers can learn 
more about these topics, and others, by reading Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA 
Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010).  The author’s FCPA Professor website 
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com) is also a useful resource for FCPA developments and 
analysis.  See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/f 
cpa-101 (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (answering frequently asked questions regarding the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).   
 1.  See generally Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 907 (2010) [hereinafter Façade] (discussing the implications of this enforcement 
dynamic). 
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enforcement. 
I. FCPA ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW—2011 
FCPA enforcement in 2011 was mild compared to 2010, when the 
DOJ and SEC combined collected approximately $1.8 billion in corporate 
fines, penalties, and disgorgement in FCPA or FCPA-related enforcement 
actions.
2
  As demonstrated in the chart below, in eleven corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions in 2011, the DOJ collected approximately $355 
million in criminal fines.  Including the approximately $149 million 
forfeiture Jeffrey Tesler (the U.K. agent at the center of the Bonny Island, 
Nigeria bribery scheme) agreed to in his 2011 plea agreement,
3
  the DOJ’s 
FCPA enforcement program in 2011 collected approximately $504 million. 
 
 
Table I - 2011 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions 
 
Company 
 
Fine Resolution Vehicle 
Maxwell Technologies
4
 $8 million DPA 
 
Tyson Foods
5
 $4 million DPA 
 
 
 2.  See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 101-04 (2011) (detailing $1.27 billion in DOJ 
corporate FCPA and FCPA-related enforcement actions in 2010 and $530 million in SEC 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2010). 
 3.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UK Solicitor Pleads Guilty for Role in Bribing 
Nigerian Government Officials as Part of KBR Joint Venture Scheme (Mar. 11, 2011), http:/ 
/www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/March/11-crm-313.html.  As noted in the DOJ’s release, 
Tesler was a former consultant to Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc. (“KBR”) and its joint 
venture partners in connection with certain engineering, procurement and construction 
contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island, Nigeria.  Id.  KBR, the 
other joint venture partners, and certain other companies and individuals previously resolved 
FCPA (or related) enforcement actions based on the same Bonny Island conduct.  Mike 
Koehler, Bonny Island Bribery Statistics, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.fcp 
aprofessor.com/bonny-island-bribery-statistics.  For instance, the JGC of Japan enforcement 
action from 2011 (the largest in terms of DOJ fine amounts from 2011) was based on Bonny 
Island conduct.  Id. 
 4.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Maxwell Technologies Inc. Resolves Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $8 Million Criminal Penalty (Jan. 31, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-crm-129.html. 
 5.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tyson Foods Inc. Agrees to Pay $4 Million 
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Allegations (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.justic 
e.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-crm-171.html. 
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JGC of Japan
6
 
(Japanese Company) 
 
$218.8 million DPA 
 
Comverse Technology
7
 $1.2 million NPA 
 
Johnson & Johnson
8
 $21.4 million DPA 
 
Tenaris
9
 
(Luxembourg Company) 
$3.5 million NPA 
 
Cinergy 
Telecommunications
10
 
N/A N/A 
 
Armor Holdings
11
 $10.2 million NPA 
 
Bridgestone
12
 
(Japanese Company) 
 
$22 million
13
 Plea 
 
Aon Corp.
14
 $1.8 million NPA 
 
 6.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html. 
 7.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Comverse Technology Inc. Agrees to Pay 
$1.2 Million Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Apr. 7, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-438.html. 
 8.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay $21.4 
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Oil for Food 
Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-446.html. 
 9.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tenaris S.A. Agrees to Pay $3.5 Million 
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 17, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-629.html. 
 10.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Florida Telecommunications Company, Two 
Executives, an Intermediary, and Two Former Haitian Government Officials Indicted for 
Their Alleged Participation in Foreign Bribery Scheme (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crm-910.html.  Unlike the vast majority of 
business organizations subject to FCPA scrutiny, Cinergy Telecommunications was 
criminally indicted and the charges against it remain pending.  Id. 
 11.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Armor Holdings Agrees to Pay $10.2 Million 
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (July 13, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crm-911.html. 
 12.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to Plead 
Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign Government Officials 
(Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-crm-1193.html. 
 13.  Based on DOJ filings, it appears that approximately eighty percent of the $28 
million fine (for both FCPA violations and antitrust violations) was based on FCPA 
conduct.  Mike Koehler, Bridgestone Corporation Resolves FCPA (and Antitrust) 
Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/cate 
gory/bridgestone-corporation. 
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Magyar Telekom / 
Deutsche Telekom
15
 
(Hungarian Company / 
German Company) 
 
$59.6 million; 
4.4 million 
 
DPA; NPA 
TOTAL $355 million  
 
In 2011, the SEC brought thirteen corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions and collected approximately $148 million in civil penalties, 
disgorgement, and prejudgment interest. 
 
Table II - 2011 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions 
 
Company Settlement Amount 
 
Maxwell Technologies
16
 
 
$6.3 million 
Tyson Foods
17
 
 
$1.2 million 
IBM Corp.
18
 
 
$10 million 
Ball Corp.
19
 
 
$300,000 
Tenaris
20
 $5.4 million 
 
 14.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Aon Corporation Agrees to Pay a $1.76 
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Dec. 
20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-crm-1678.html. 
 15.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom 
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay Nearly $64 Million 
in Combined Criminal Penalties (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/Dece 
mber/11-crm-1714.html. 
 16.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Maxwell Technologies 
for Long-Running Bribery Scheme in China (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.go 
v/news/press/2011/2011-31.htm. 
 17.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Tyson Foods With FCPA 
Violations (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-42.htm. 
 18.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, IBM to Pay $10 Million in Settled 
FCPA Enforcement Action (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/l 
r21889.htm. 
 19.  Ball Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 64123, 2011 WL 1099562 (ALJ Mar. 24, 
2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-
64123.pdf. 
 20.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s 
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(Luxembourg Company) 
 
Rockwell Automation
21
 
 
$2.7 million 
Johnson & Johnson
22
 
 
$48.6 million 
Comverse Technologies
23
 
 
$1.6 million 
Armor Holdings
24
 
 
$5.7 million 
Diageo
25
 
(United Kingdom Company) 
 
$16.4 million 
Watts Water Technologies
26
 
 
$3.8 million 
Aon Corp.
27
 
 
$14.5 million 
Magyar Telekom / Deutsche 
Telekom
28
 
(Hungarian Company / German 
Company) 
$31.2 million 
 
First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
/2011/2011-112.htm. 
 21.  Rockwell Automation Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 64380, 2011 WL 1663602 
(ALJ May 3, 2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-64380.pdf. 
 22.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges J&J with Foreign Bribery 
(April 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-87.htm. 
 23.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files Settled FCPA Case Against 
Comverse (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21920.htm. 
 24.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Armor Holdings, Inc. 
with FCPA Violations in Connection with Sales to the United Nations (July 13, 2011), http:/ 
/www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-146.htm. 
 25.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Liquor Giant Diageo 
with FCPA Violations (July 27, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-158.htm. 
 26.  Watts Water Techs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 65555, 2011 WL 4860051 
(ALJ Oct. 13, 2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ad 
min/2011/34-65555.pdf. 
 27.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files Settled FCPA Charges 
Against Aon Corporation (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr2 
2203.htm. 
 28.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Magyar Telekom and 
Former Executives with Bribing Officials in Macedonia and Montenegro (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-279.htm. 
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TOTAL $148 million 
 
Combined DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement in 2011 collected 
approximately $652 million.
29
 
Although it is interesting to compare year-to-year enforcement 
statistics, such a comparison is of marginal value as many non-substantive 
factors can influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action.
30
  What is 
valuable to observe and analyze are FCPA enforcement trends and 2011 
witnessed a continuation of several significant trends, including four 
discussed below. 
 
 29.  This figure includes the $149 million Jeffrey Tesler enforcement action.  As 
evident from the DOJ and SEC charts above, there is substantial overlap between the DOJ 
and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs.  FCPA enforcement actions typically involve 
related and coordinated enforcement actions by the DOJ for criminal FCPA violations 
(whether anti-bribery violations or books and records and internal control violations) and the 
SEC for civil FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or books and records and 
internal control violations).  Enforcement actions from 2011 that fit this pattern include:  
Maxwell Technologies, Tyson Foods, Comverse, Johnson & Johnson, Tenaris, Armor 
Holdings, Aon, and Magyar Telekom/Deutsche Telekom.  The overlap, however, between 
the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs is not complete.  As a general matter, the 
SEC has jurisdiction only over “issuers” (both domestic and foreign companies with shares 
registered on a U.S. exchange and domestic and foreign companies otherwise required to 
make filings with the SEC).  In other words, the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction 
over private companies.  Thus, certain FCPA enforcement actions from 2010, such as 
Bridgestone, Cinergy Telecommunications and JGC of Japan, did not have an SEC 
component.  As a general matter, the DOJ has jurisdiction over “issuers,” “domestic 
concerns,” (any business entity with a principal place of business in the U.S. or organized 
under U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies and persons to the extent a bribery scheme 
involve conduct “while in the territory of the U.S.”  Because the DOJ must satisfy a higher 
burden of proof in a criminal prosecution, and given the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion, 
certain FCPA enforcement actions in 2011 such as those involving Watts Water 
Technologies, Diageo, Rockwell Automation, Ball Corporation, and IBM, only included an 
SEC component.  As to the DOJ’s discretion, the DOJ has stated that it has declined 
prosecutions when, among other things, a single employee—and no other employee—was 
involved in the improper payments at issue, and the improper payments at issue involved 
minimal funds compared to the overall business revenues.  See Mike Koehler, DOJ Declines 
To Get Specific In Declination Responses, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.fc 
paprofessor.com/doj-declines-to-get-specific-in-declination-responses (analyzing DOJ 
rationale for declining to bring an enforcement action). 
 30.  Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve both a DOJ and SEC component 
typically are announced on the same day, and because the DOJ and SEC are separate 
enforcement agencies, it is common for FCPA enforcement actions to be delayed while one 
agency waits for the other agency to finish its investigation.  Additional non-substantive 
factors that can influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action include, among other 
things, DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee departures or leaves), and 
securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA enforcement action. 
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A. Enforcement Actions Against Foreign Companies and Foreign 
Nationals 
The first significant trend highlighted by the 2011 enforcement year is 
the magnitude and quantity of FCPA enforcement actions against foreign 
companies and nationals.  Foreign companies may be subject to the 
FCPA’s jurisdiction if the company is an “issuer” (i.e., it has shares listed 
on a U.S. exchange),
31
 or if the company, “while in the territory of the 
United States,” generally engaged in conduct in furtherance of a bribery 
scheme.
32
  Foreign nationals can be subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction if the 
individual is an “officer, director, employee, or agent” of an “issuer”
33
 or 
“domestic concern,”
34
 or if the individual, “while in the territory of the 
United States,” generally engaged in conduct in furtherance of a bribery 
scheme.
35
 
As indicated in Table I, approximately ninety percent of DOJ FCPA 
monetary collections in 2011 were against foreign companies or nationals.  
While less dramatic, as indicated in Table II, foreign issuers paid a 
significant portion (approximately thirty-six percent) of SEC FCPA 
monetary collections in 2011.  Not only are the enforcement agencies 
targeting foreign companies, but foreign nationals as well.  As indicated in 
Table III below, in 2011 the DOJ brought ten individual FCPA 
enforcement actions and nine of them were against foreign nationals. 
 
Table III - 2011 DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions 
 
Individual Nationality 
Washington Cruz
36
 
 
Amadeus Richer 
U.S. Citizen 
 
German Citizen and Resident 
of Brazil 
Uriel Sharef
37
 Dual Citizen of Israel and 
 
 31.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). 
 32.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. 
 33.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 
 34.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. 
 35.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. 
 36.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Florida Telecommunications Company, Two 
Executives, an Intermediary and Two Former Haitian Government Officials Indicted for 
Their Alleged Participation in Foreign Bribery Scheme (July 13, 2011), http://www.justice.g 
ov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crm-910.html.  Both individuals are associated with Cinergy 
Telecommunications. 
 37.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eight Former Senior Executives and Agents 
of Siemens Charged in Alleged $100 Million Foreign Bribe Scheme (Dec. 13, 2011), http:// 
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Herbert Steffen 
 
Andres Truppel 
 
 
Ulrich Bock 
 
Stephan Singer 
 
Eberhard Reichert 
 
Carlos Sergi 
 
Miguel Czysch 
 
Germany 
German Citizen 
 
Dual Citizen of Germany and 
Argentina 
 
Citizen of Germany 
 
Citizen of Germany 
 
Citizen of Germany 
 
Citizen of Argentina 
 
Citizen of Germany and 
Resident of Switzerland 
 
As indicated in Table IV below, the SEC brought twelve individual 
FCPA enforcement actions in 2011, and all twelve were against foreign 
nationals. 
 
Table IV - 2011 SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions 
 
Individual Nationality 
 
Paul Jennings
38
 Dual Citizen of the U.K. and 
the U.S. 
Urief Sharef
39
 Dual Citizen of Israel and 
 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-crm-1626.html.  All individuals are associated 
with Siemens.  In 2008, Siemens settled the largest enforcement action (in terms of fine or 
penalty amount) in FCPA history.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and 
Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to 
Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html. 
 38.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Former CEO of Innospec 
for Role in Bribery Scheme (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-
21.htm (identifying Jennings as the CEO of Innospec, Inc., a company that resolved an 
FCPA enforcement action in 2010); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files 
Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Innospec, Inc. for Engaging in 
Bribery in Iraq and Indonesia With Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of $40.2 Million 
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21454.htm. 
 39.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Seven Former Siemens 
Executives with Bribing Leaders in Argentina (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigatio 
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Herbert Steffen 
 
Andres Truppel 
 
 
Ulrich Bock 
 
Stephan Singer 
 
Carlos Sergi 
 
Bernd Regendantz 
 
Germany 
 
Citizen of Germany 
 
Dual Citizen of Germany and 
Argentina 
 
Citizen of Germany 
 
Citizen of Germany 
 
Citizen of Argentina 
 
Citizen of Germany 
Elek Straub
40
 
 
Andras Balogh 
 
Tamas Morvai 
 
Citizen of Hungary 
 
Citizen of Hungary 
 
Citizen of Hungary 
 
The DOJ and SEC’s enforcement action against former Siemens’ 
executives is noteworthy.  In the 2008 FCPA enforcement action against 
Siemens, the enforcement agencies stated that for much of its operations 
“overseas, bribery was nothing less than standard operating procedure for 
Siemens” and that “a corporate culture [existed at Siemens] in which 
bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the 
company.”
41
  The DOJ’s sentencing memorandum specifically stated that 
the company’s compliance, legal, internal audit, and corporate finance 
departments all “played a significant role” in the conduct at issue.
42
 
 
n/litreleases/2011/lr22190.htm.  All individuals are associated with Siemens. 
 40.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Magyar Telekom and 
Former Executives with Bribing Officials in Macedonia and Montenegro (Dec. 29, 2011), ht 
tp://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-279.htm.  All individuals are associated with 
Magyar Telekom. 
 41.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference 
Announcing Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Violations (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-opa-
1112.html (explaining Siemens’ guilty plea and detailing the particulars of Siemens’ 
conduct that allegedly violated the FCPA). 
 42.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www 
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For a number of years, the DOJ faced intense scrutiny as to why the 
most egregious corporate enforcement action in FCPA history did not 
result in any individual charges against company employees.
43
  For 
instance, in May 2010 Senator Arlen Specter (then-chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee) asked DOJ Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer 
about the lack of individual prosecutions in the Siemens matter to which 
Breuer stated that the DOJ’s investigation as to individuals remained 
open.
44
  During a November 2010 hearing titled “Examination of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” Senator Specter again asked DOJ Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Greg Andres whether anybody went to jail in 
the Siemens case.
45
  Andres again stated that the investigation remained 
open.
46
  During my testimony at the hearing, Senator Specter asked me to 
assist in detailing “egregious examples of individual conduct associated 
with the Siemens prosecution,” and I provided to his office detailed 
information that could be gleaned from public sources.
47
  The Siemens 
individual enforcement actions from 2011 will likely be difficult cases to 
prosecute as, among other things, all of the defendants are located outside 
of the U.S. and extradition battles are sure to follow.  It remains to be seen 
whether the DOJ and SEC are actually committed to prosecuting the 
charged individuals or whether the charges were merely symbolic to 
assuage criticism. 
Professor Brandon Garrett has demonstrated how the rise in corporate 
FCPA enforcement actions against foreign companies “bears a family 
resemblance” to trends in other substantive areas such as antitrust and 
environmental law.
48
  However, the U.S. law enforcement interest in 
 
.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensvenez-sent.pdf. 
 43.  See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Siemens Charges Follow Heat From Critics, CORRUPTION 
CURRENTS (Dec. 13, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/12/13/s 
iemens-charges-follow-heat-from-critics/ (discussing a congressional hearing in which 
Senator Specter and the author criticized the lack of individual prosecutions in high-profile 
cases). 
 44.  See Mike Koehler, Breuer–Siemens Investigation (As to Individuals) Remains 
Open, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 10, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/breuer-siemens-
investigation-as-to-individuals-remains-open (“[I]ndividuals, executives and others who 
were involved [in the Siemens bribery scandal], remain exposed and the matter is not 
closed.”). 
 45.  See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2010), 
[hereinafter Examining Enforcement of the FCPA Hearing], http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov 
/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:66921.pdf. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See id. at 32–38 (using a chart to identify specific references of egregious 
individual conduct). 
 48.  See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 
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prosecuting such foreign companies and nationals for instances of alleged 
non-U.S. bribery can be debated.  For example, can it truly be said that the 
U.S. Treasury is the best place for enforcement dollars when a foreign 
company allegedly bribes a foreign official? 
Yet it is clear from this new era of FCPA enforcement that the 
enforcement agencies view their mission as global in nature and the 
agencies will not shy away from aggressive jurisdictional theories in 
pursuit of foreign bribery riches.  For instance, the jurisdictional facts 
alleged in the $95 million Magyar Telekom/Deutsche Telekom 
enforcement action to support FCPA anti-bribery charges against the 
Hungarian company and related charges against its German parent 
corporation were two e-mails that passed through or were stored on U.S. 
servers.
49
  Likewise, the jurisdictional facts alleged in the $219 million 
enforcement action against Japan’s JGC Corporation were money flowing 
through U.S.-based accounts and the faxing or e-mailing of certain 
information into the U.S.
50
  As Professor Garret observed, “litigation of 
jurisdiction is almost non-existent in [foreign] corporate prosecutions, 
because firms plead guilty rather than litigate such issues.”
51
  However, 
foreign nationals individually charged with FCPA offenses are more likely 
to contest aggressive jurisdictional theories when faced with deprivation of 
their liberty.  Indeed, a notable development from 2011, discussed in more 
detail in Part II of this Article, was judicial rejection of the DOJ’s asserted 
jurisdiction in prosecution of a foreign national in the Africa Sting case. 
Few question the U.S. foreign bribery surplus.  After all, FCPA 
enforcement has become a reliable revenue source for the federal 
government during a period of budget restraints.  Commenting on the 
increase in FCPA enforcement, the DOJ’s former Assistant Chief for FCPA 
enforcement stated, “[t]he government sees a profitable program, and it’s 
going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it anymore.”
52
  Indeed, 
 
1837 (2011), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/content/pdfs/97/1775.pdf 
(observing that, as in other areas, the rise in FCPA enforcement actions is a product of high-
profile convictions and greater cooperation between DOJ and other countries). 
 49.  See Information ¶¶ 24, 26, United States v. Magyar Telekom, Plc., No. 
1:11CR00597 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/cases/magyar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-magyar-telekom.pdf (citing conduct 
that took place entirely in Macedonia with only minor connections to the United States). 
 50.  See Information ¶ 20, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260 (S.D. Tex. 
Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/04-6-
11jgc-corp-info.pdf (listing a Japanese corporation’s overt acts with only minor connections 
to the United States). 
 51.  Brandon Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1782 
(2011). 
 52.  Joseph Rosenbloom, Here Come the Payoff Police, AM. LAWYER, May 17, 2010, at 
14. 
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Transparency International (“TI”), a leading civil society organization that 
focuses on corruption issues, made the following statement in encouraging 
other countries to strengthen the fight against corruption: 
[P]rosecutors in the US, Germany and the UK announced a 
number of settlements of important foreign bribery cases in 
which the defendants agreed to pay fines amounting to many 
hundreds of millions of dollars.  These settlements demonstrate 
the ability of prosecutors to resolve cases without interminable 
litigation.  The settlement levels provide a sharp wake-up call to 
international business regarding the gravity of foreign bribery.  
They should also make clear to laggard governments that 
investing in adequate enforcement can have substantial returns.
53
 
With good reasons, return on investment is not a concept typically 
linked to justice and the rule of law.
54
  However, TI’s statement (and those 
of other civil society organizations that champion “get tough on bribery” 
positions seemingly oblivious to the broader public policy implications in 
such an approach) helps facilitate a new “global arms race” in which 
bringing the highest quantity of bribery-related enforcement actions 
appears to be more important than the quality of the actions.  Indeed, the 
OECD’s recent report on U.S. implementation and enforcement of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (the “OECD Report”) contained the 
contradiction of praising the U.S. for its “high level” of enforcement, yet 
criticizing and questioning many of the policies and enforcement theories 
that yield the “high level” of enforcement.
55
 
Members of Congress are rightfully concerned about the U.S. 
crackdown on alleged instances of foreign bribery by foreign companies 
and nationals.  During the 2010 Senate FCPA hearing, Senator Christopher 
Coons (D-DE), a former in-house attorney at a multinational company, 
stated: 
I am interested in what might someday happen as our allies begin 
to join us, the Italians, the U.K. government, others, and then 
 
 53.  FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, PROGRESS REPORT 2010: ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 9 (Transparency International 3d ed. 2010), available at 
http://www.transparency.cz/doc/2010Progress_Report_2nd_edition_10.9.10.pdf. 
 54.  See, e.g., Monty Raphael, Judiciary Must Be Hard-Wired Into UK Plea 
Bargaining, THE LAWYER, Oct. 9, 2011, http://www.thelawyer.com/judiciary-must-be-hard-
wired-into-uk-plea-bargaining/1009709.article (“If the driver for the criminal regulation of 
business is how big a return a country can derive from its investigations, such regulation 
will be bereft of integrity and, most importantly, predictability.”). 
 55.  See Mike Koehler, The OECD Report—Initial Observations, FCPA PROFESSOR, 
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-oecd-report-initial-observations (noting 
specific examples of contradictions contained within the OECD Report). 
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how we would begin to harmonize the actual enforcement.  
Today, we are the only nation that is extending an extraterritorial 
reach and going after the citizens of other countries, we may 
someday find ourselves on the receiving end of such 
transnational actions.
56
 
B. Reliance on Voluntary Disclosures in Bringing Enforcement 
Actions 
The second enforcement trend highlighted by the 2011 enforcement 
year is the enforcement agencies’ continued heavy reliance on corporate 
voluntary disclosures or other instances of public disclosure (such as prior 
foreign law enforcement investigations) in bringing FCPA enforcement 
actions.
57
  In 2011, ninety-nine percent of the approximate $504 million 
collected by the DOJ in FCPA enforcement actions was the result of such 
disclosures,
58
 and ninety-seven percent of the approximate $148 million 
collected by the SEC was the result of such disclosures.
59
 
Corporate voluntary disclosures are particularly noteworthy and 
represent the proverbial “elephant in the room” that is seldom subject to 
frank discussion.
60
  To be sure, there are some “carrots” and “sticks” that 
 
 56.  Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 23 
(2010), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings& 
docid=f:66921.pdf. 
 57.  Voluntary disclosure generally refers to the process by which a company on its 
own (often through internal audits or internal reporting mechanisms) learns of conduct that 
might implicate the FCPA and, after an internal investigation, the company’s lawyers 
disclose the conduct that might implicate the FCPA to the enforcement agencies even 
though, in many cases, the enforcement agencies would likely not otherwise find out about 
the conduct.  The FCPA does not require such disclosures, but general securities law issues 
such as materiality may be relevant.  However, few instances of conduct implicating the 
FCPA rise to the level of materiality. 
 58.  See Mike Koehler, DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA—Year in Review, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-
year-in-review-2 (detailing each DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement action in 2011 including 
whether the enforcement action was the result of a voluntary disclosure or other instance of 
public disclosure such as previous foreign law enforcement investigations). 
 59.  See Mike Koehler, SEC Enforcement of the FCPA—Year in Review, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Jan. 10 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/sec-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-
year-in-review (detailing each SEC corporate FCPA enforcement action in 2011 including 
whether the enforcement action was the result of a voluntary disclosure or other instance of 
public disclosure such as previous foreign law enforcement investigations). 
 60.  This may be due to the fact that corporate voluntary disclosures involve potential 
conflict of interest issues for lawyers advising corporate clients on the voluntary disclosure 
decision.  See Mike Koehler, Voluntary Disclosures and the Role of FCPA Counsel, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/voluntary-disclosures-and-the-
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encourage corporate voluntary disclosure.  For instance, the DOJ’s 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations state that 
whether an organization timely and voluntarily disclosed the alleged 
wrongdoing to the DOJ is a factor in determining how the DOJ will resolve 
the matter.
61
  Likewise, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines allow for a 
lower fine if a company “reported the offense to appropriate government 
authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated 
recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal 
conduct.”
62
  However, whether these “carrots” are actually awarded to 
companies that voluntarily disclose to the enforcement agencies is the 
subject of much dispute and debate.
63
 
Moreover, the same “carrots” and “sticks” that may motivate FCPA 
voluntary disclosures are present in every DOJ and SEC investigation 
regardless of the substantive area of law at issue.  Why then is corporate 
voluntary disclosure such a prominent feature of FCPA enforcement, but 
less prominent in other areas of law? 
An answer may be that corporate voluntary disclosures feed a thriving 
and growing FCPA industry whose participants, both in the government 
and the private sector, have vested interests in seeing it continue.
64
  The 
enforcement agencies favor and encourage self-reporting because it makes 
their jobs easier and is cost-effective from a budget and resource 
standpoint.  Private-sector participants in FCPA industry—law firms, 
forensic accounting firms, investigative firms, etc.—have an interest in 
voluntary disclosures because, to state the obvious, voluntary disclosures 
lead to additional work.  It is a well-known fact in the FCPA industry that 
voluntary disclosures, even as to conduct limited in scope, often prompt the 
enforcement agencies to ask the “where else” question that results in multi-
year, global reviews of any company that voluntarily discloses.  For 
 
role-of-fcpa-counsel (discussing corporate voluntary disclosures and potential conflict of 
interest issues FCPA counsel faces in advising companies as to disclosure issues). 
 61.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2008) 
(providing a set of factors prosecutors should consider in determining whether to bring 
criminal charges against a business organization, or to negotiate a plea or other agreement 
such as a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement). 
 62.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2011). 
 63.  See, e.g., Nick Elliott, Regulators Like Self-Reporting, Some Attorneys Aren’t Sure, 
CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Mar. 31, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2011/03/31/regulators-like-self-reporting-some-attorneys-arent-sure/ (discussing 
the potential negative consequences of self-reporting). 
 64.  See, e.g., Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES, May 24, 2010, at 70-77 
(detailing, based on comments from the DOJ’s former FCPA chief, how the increase in 
FCPA enforcement is “good business for law firms . . . good business for accounting firms, 
it’s good business for consulting firms, the media—and Justice Department lawyers who 
create the marketplace and then get [themselves] a job”). 
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instance, the Tyson Foods enforcement action focused on conduct in 
Mexico involving one company subsidiary, which “comprised less than one 
percent of Tyson’s global net sales.”
65
  Even though approximately eighty-
five percent to ninety percent of Tyson’s sales were domestic, in resolving 
the enforcement action, Tyson “subjected to rigorous FCPA reviews” all of 
its wholly-owned production facilities, including those located outside of 
Mexico.
66
 
Commenting on this trend, FCPA practitioner Claudius Sokenu stated 
as follows: 
What has caused the most angst is . . . the oppressive and 
dictatorial manner in which the government causes corporations 
to expend significant resources in conducting overly broad 
investigations that cost millions of dollars with little more than a 
hunch that potentially violative conduct is afoot.  Time and time 
again, we see internal investigations that span dozens of countries 
in one company and the cost of doing those multi-country 
internal investigations, and the disruption to business, not to 
mention a corporation’s reputational damage.  This can be 
significant.  I think what is most needed is prosecutorial 
discretion from the SEC and Justice Department on what to 
investigate and the breadth of the investigation.
67
 
That the “where else” question is asked in the absence of any 
meaningful check or judicial oversight raises a host of problematic ethical 
and policy issues.  For example, the enforcement attorneys who ask the 
“where else” question increase the demand for private-sector FCPA 
services and frequently leave government service for the FCPA private-
sector.
68
  FCPA counsel, to whom the “where else” question is posed, have 
little incentive to push-back as the “where else” question often leads to 
multi-year, multi-country billing bonanzas.  Even if FCPA counsel were 
 
 65.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 
1:11-cr-00037-RWR (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fr 
aud/fcpa/cases/tyson-foods/02-10-11tyson_foods_dpa.pdf. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Providing Excellent Service Through a Global Perspective, METRO CORP. 
COUNSEL, June 2011, at 11. 
 68.  The examples of DOJ or SEC FCPA enforcement attorneys leaving government 
service for the private FCPA bar are numerous.  See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, 
FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-21 
(describing various attorneys’ transition from the Department of Justice to white-collar 
defense practices in private practice, and in particular, Mark Mendelsohn’s move to Paul 
Weiss); Mike Koehler, News Corp. Hires Mendelsohn . . . And More On The Revolving 
Door, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 21, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/news-corp-hires-
mendelsohn-and-more-on-the-revolving-door (discussing further the transition from the 
public sector to private practice, and public policy implications). 
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inclined to push back on behalf of clients, cooperation in the government’s 
investigation remains one influential factor in the enforcement agencies’ 
charging decisions and ultimate fine and penalty amounts.
69
 
The predominance of corporate voluntary disclosures in this new era 
of FCPA enforcement has clearly contributed to the creation and growth of 
a vibrant industry and FCPA issues, no matter how limited in scope, often 
turn into a boondoggle for many involved.
70
  Yet, corporate counsel and 
others making business decisions on behalf of a company need to 
understand that thoroughly investigating an issue, promptly implementing 
remedial measures, and effectively revising and enhancing compliance 
policies and procedures—internally, and without disclosure to the 
enforcement agencies—is a perfectly acceptable, legitimate, and legal 
response to FCPA issues in all but the rarest of circumstances. 
C. Extensive Use of Alternative Resolution Vehicles 
The third enforcement trend highlighted by the 2011 enforcement year 
is the extensive use of non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) and deferred 
prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions.  These alternative resolution vehicles do not result in any actual 
prosecuted charges against the company entering into the agreement and 
the vehicles are not subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny.
71
  Such 
alternative resolution vehicles are used in other substantive areas of law, 
but the predominate use of such vehicles is to resolve FCPA inquiries.
72
  As 
detailed in Table I, in 2011, nine of the eleven DOJ corporate FCPA 
 
 69.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2008) (listing 
cooperation as a factor in charging decisions); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
8C2.5(g) (2011), (listing cooperation as a factor in sentencing decisions). 
 70.  For example, in 2008, Avon Products Inc. began an internal investigation as to 
FCPA issues in China and other countries.  The investigation has blossomed into 
compliance reviews “in a number of other countries, selected to represent each of the 
Company’s international geographic segments.”  Avon Products, Inc., Quarterly Report 
(Form 10-Q) (Oct. 27, 2011).  Avon, as of February 2011, has reportedly spent over $150 
million on its FCPA internal investigation, which is not yet complete.  See Aruna 
Viswanatha, Avon Spending on FCPA Investigation Tops $150 Million, MAIN JUSTICE (Feb. 
24, 2011, 10:28 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/2011/02/24/avon-
spending-on-fcpa-investigation-tops-150-million/. 
 71.  See Façade supra note 1, at 933-39 (discussing the increase in NPAs and DPAs 
and various criticisms of NPAs and DPAs). 
 72.  See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2011 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE 
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (2012), http://www.gibsondu 
nn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndUpdate-CorporateDeferredProsecution-
NonProsecutionAgreements.pdf (discussing the use of NPAs and DPAs to resolve various 
enforcement actions, including FCPA enforcement actions). 
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enforcement actions (eighty-two percent) were resolved via an NPA or 
DPA.
73
 
The DOJ first used an alternative resolution vehicle in an FCPA 
enforcement action in 2004.
74
  Since 2004, an NPA or DPA has been used 
to resolve forty-seven of the sixty-one (seventy-seven percent) core 
corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.
75
  It is clear that the DOJ’s use 
of such vehicles in the FCPA context is one of the reasons for the increase 
in FCPA enforcement actions.  Mark Mendelsohn, the former deputy chief 
of the DOJ’s FCPA unit, stated that if the DOJ did not have the option of 
resolving FCPA enforcement actions with NPAs or DPAs, the DOJ “would 
certainly bring fewer cases.”
76
  Likewise, the OECD Report stated as 
follows:  “It seems quite clear that the use of these agreements is one of the 
reasons for the impressive FCPA enforcement record in the U.S.”
77
 
Use of such resolution vehicles to resolve alleged corporate criminal 
liability in the FCPA context and other areas present two distinct, yet 
equally problematic, public policy issues.  First, resolution vehicles allow 
egregious instances of corporate conduct to be resolved too lightly.  
Because the government does not file actual charges to which a company 
must plead, such conduct is often resolved without adequate sanctions and 
without achieving maximum deterrence.
78
  Indeed, it is notable to observe 
 
 73.  Further, a notable development from 2011 is that the SEC used such a vehicle (a 
DPA) for the first time in an FCPA enforcement against Tenaris.  See Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tenaris, S.A., (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.g 
ov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf.  In January 2010, the SEC announced “a series of 
measures to further strengthen its enforcement program by encouraging greater cooperation 
from individuals and companies in the agency’s investigations and enforcement actions.”  
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage 
Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm.  Among the measures was use of NPAs 
and DPAs. 
 74.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, InVision Technologies Inc. Enters into 
Agreement with the United States (Dec. 6, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/Dece 
mber/04_crm_780.htm (providing the key terms of the Department’s agreement with 
InVision Technologies, Inc.). 
 75.  See Mike Koehler, DOJ Prosecution of Individual—Are Other Factors at Play?, 
FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-
individuals-are-other-factors-at-play (analyzing FCPA enforcement actions as of September 
2011). 
 76.  Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, CORP. CRIME REP., Sept. 13, 
2010, at 15. 
 77.  OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS., UNITED STATES: PHASE 3 REPORT 
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED 
RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf. 
 78.  See e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall Street Polices Itself, 
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that seven of the top ten enforcement actions (in terms of fine and penalty 
amount) in the FCPA’s history have been resolved with an NPA or DPA.
79
  
The second is that such vehicles, because of the same factors discussed 
above, nudge companies to agree to the vehicles for reasons of risk-
aversion and efficiency, and not necessarily because the conduct at issue 
actually violates the FCPA.
80
  Thus, use of NPAs or DPAs contributes to 
“over-prosecution” of business conduct,
81
 while at the same time allowing 
for “under-prosecution” of egregious instance of corporate bribery.  For 
these reasons, it is in the public interest to abolish these resolution vehicles. 
D. Lack of Individual Prosecutions 
The fourth FCPA enforcement trend highlighted by the 2011 
enforcement year is the continued lack of individual prosecutions in most 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions.  In my 2010 Senate testimony, I 
stated that corporate fine-only FCPA enforcement is not effective and does 
not adequately deter future FCPA violations.
82
  Rather, what is key to 
achieving deterrence is prosecuting individuals to the extent the 
individual’s conduct legitimately satisfies the elements of an FCPA anti-
bribery violation.
83
 
 
Prosecutors Use Softer Approach, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federal-prosecutors-are-lenient-as-
companies-break-the-law.html?_r=2&ref=gretchenmorgenson (detailing the rise in NPAs 
and DPAs and addressing, among other things, whether the agreements run the risk of 
“letting companies off too easily”). 
 79.  Richard A. Cassin, With Magyar in New Top Ten, It’s 90% Non-U.S., THE FCPA 
BLOG, (Dec. 29, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/12/29/with-magyar-
in-new-top-ten-its-90-non-us.html (listing the top ten FCPA enforcement actions in terms of 
fine or penalty amount). 
 80.  See Façade, supra note 1, at 924-29 (discussing the increase in NPAs and DPAs 
and various criticisms of NPAs and DPAs).  Indeed, former DOJ FCPA chief Mark 
Mendelsohn stated that the “danger” of NPAs and DPAs “is that it is tempting for the [DOJ] 
or the SEC since it too now has these options available, to seek to resolve cases through 
DPAs or NPAs that don’t actually constitute violations of the law.”  Mark Mendelsohn on 
the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 24 CORP. CRIME REP. 35, 35 (Sept. 10, 2010). 
 81.  See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, Settlements Feed U.S. Prosecutor Overreach, 
REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (Sept. 19, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/b 
reakingviews-settlements-feed-us-prosecutor-overreach (stating that settlements encourage 
federal prosecutors to overreach). 
 82.  Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14-15 (2010) 
(statement of Mike Koehler, Professor at Southern Illinois University School of Law). 
 83.  Id.; see also James Stewart, Bribery, But Nobody Was Charged, N.Y. TIMES, June 
24, 2011, at B1 (“[S]urely bribery, not to mention other forms of corporate wrongdoing, 
would be more effectively deterred if someone was actually held accountable for it.”). 
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Nevertheless, FCPA enforcement largely remains corporate 
enforcement only.  Of the eleven corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
brought by the DOJ in 2011, only three (twenty-seven percent) have 
resulted, at present, in related enforcement actions against company 
employees.
84
  Likewise, of the thirteen corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions brought by the SEC in 2011, only two (fifteen percent) have 
resulted, at present, in related enforcement actions against company 
employees.
85
 
To be sure, the 2011 enforcement year ended with a bang as the DOJ 
and SEC charged several former foreign executives of Siemens and 
Magyar Telekom.
86
  In addition, as demonstrated by the Siemens individual 
indictments, individual prosecutions can follow years after a related 
corporate FCPA enforcement action.  However, the lack of individual 
prosecutions in the majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions causes 
one to legitimately wonder whether the conduct serving as the basis for the 
corporate enforcement action was engaged in by ghosts. 
On the other hand, an equally plausible reason for the lack of 
individual FCPA prosecutions in connection with corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions may be the quality of the corporate enforcement 
action.  As detailed above, a significant majority of DOJ corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions are resolved via alternative resolution vehicles and, 
given the dynamics at play, companies are often nudged to agree to these 
vehicles for reasons of risk-aversion and efficiency and not necessarily 
because the conduct at issue actually violates the FCPA.  Individuals, on 
the other hand, face a deprivation of personal liability in FCPA 
enforcement actions, and are more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high 
burden of proof as to all FCPA elements. 
In support of this theory for the lack of related individual prosecutions 
in the majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions is the following 
fact:  Since the advent of alternative resolution vehicles in the FCPA 
context in 2004, only fifteen percent of corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions resolved with such vehicles have resulted in related charges against 
company employees or those affiliated with the company.
87
  In the view of 
many, the current era of corporate criminal law enforcement “encourage[s] 
prosecutors to pursue what they can punish, not what the law prohibits,”
88
 
and “prosecutors start to believe that the law means whatever they have 
 
 84.  Koehler, supra note 58. 
 85.  Koehler, supra note 59. 
 86.  See supra notes 36, 38, 39 (documenting enforcement actions against foreign 
executives). 
 87.  Koehler, supra note 75. 
 88.  Holding, supra note 81. 
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been able to get [corporate] defendants to agree to” in resolution 
documents.
89
 
Against this backdrop, perhaps a more appropriate question should be 
not why do so few DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions result in 
individual prosecutions, but rather, do many DOJ corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions actually evidence proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that FCPA violations occurred? 
As highlighted in Part I of this Article, FCPA enforcement in 2011 
may have been mild compared to FCPA enforcement in 2010, but the 
continuation of observable trends raise several basic questions as the FCPA 
nears its thirty-fifth year. 
As to the number, magnitude, and quantity of FCPA enforcement 
actions against foreign companies and nationals:  What will be the impact 
of the enforcement agencies’ global mission of enforcing the FCPA against 
foreign companies and nationals often on aggressive jurisdictional 
theories?  Is foreign bribery enforcement a desirable form of government 
investment and revenue?  Will a focus on return of investment facilitate a 
new “global arms race” in which bringing the highest quantity of 
enforcement actions is more important than the quality of the actions? 
As to the reliance on corporate voluntary disclosures in bringing 
FCPA enforcement actions:  Does this dynamic feed a thriving and 
growing FCPA industry that has vested interests in seeing a continuation of 
aggressive and broad enforcement and inquiries? 
As to the extensive use of alternative resolution vehicles to resolve 
FCPA enforcement actions:  Do NPAs and DPAs contribute to “over-
prosecution” of business conduct while at the same time allowing “under-
prosecution” of egregious instances of corporate bribery? 
As to the lack of individual prosecutions in most corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions:  Is corporate bribery engaged in by ghosts or is a 
reason for the general lack of individual prosecutions in corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions due to the quality of the corporate enforcement action? 
II. FCPA SCRUTINY—2011 
The big story from 2011 is not that FCPA enforcement statistics 
decreased compared to 2010, but that the FCPA was subjected to the most 
meaningful public scrutiny in its history.  Public scrutiny of the FCPA and 
FCPA enforcement came from multiple directions:  Congress, the judiciary, 
and others such as academics, the press, and public interest groups.  As 
 
 89.  Michael Levy, Prosecutorial Common Law, FCPA PROFESSOR, (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/prosecutorial-common-law. 
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discussed below, this scrutiny reveals that as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth 
year, basic legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope, and 
effectiveness of the FCPA and FCPA enforcement. 
A. Congressional Scrutiny 
Historically, Congress has taken little interest in the FCPA since its 
last substantive reforms in 1988.
90
  However, congressional interest in the 
FCPA and FCPA enforcement has rightfully grown as FCPA enforcement 
has increased over the past few years, as enforcement theories have become 
more aggressive, and as the competiveness of U.S. business in the global 
marketplace has declined. 
In June 2011, picking up where the Senate left off in late 2010 on 
FCPA reform,
91
 a House Judiciary Subcommittee held an FCPA hearing 
focused on a wide range of issues.
92
  In many ways, the hearing was similar 
to FCPA reform hearings twenty-five years ago, in that a common theme 
was whether the current FCPA enforcement environment harms U.S. 
business. 
In opening the hearing, Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) noted 
that “the world was a very different place” when the FCPA was passed in 
1977, but since then “the world has turned upside down . . .  China has 
become a global manufacturing power, [and] [t]he nature of overseas 
business has changed.”
93
  Placing FCPA enforcement in the context of the 
recent economic downturn, Sensenbrenner stated that “FCPA prosecutions 
should be effective and fair,” yet at the same time “predictable” so that the 
“rules of the road . . . [are] clear[]” so that “business can start moving 
again.”
94
  In an opening statement, Robert Scott (D-VA) commented on the 
necessity of periodically reviewing laws to make sure they “remain fair and 
just.”
95
  Representative Scott’s remark was similar to that made by William 
Brock (U.S. Trade Representative) in a 1981 New York Times opinion piece 
when he observed as follows: 
 
 90.  The FCPA was also amended in 1998 to incorporate certain aspects of the OECD 
Convention into the FCPA.  See Declaration of Prof. Michael J. Koehler in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the Indictment at ¶ 17, United 
States v. Stuart Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter 
Koehler’s Carson Declaration] (providing an overview of the FCPA’s legislative history). 
 91.  See Examining Enforcement of the FCPA Hearing, supra note 45. 
 92.  See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 47 (2011) 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.pdf. 
 93.  Id. at 1. 
 94.  Id. at 2. 
 95.  Id. at 4. 
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Just because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act spotlights a 
sensitive subject . . . some people turn a blind eye to its 
shortcomings rather than risk being accused of being “soft on 
bribery.”  That is too easy a way out.  Retreating from 
controversy will not cure the law’s deficiencies. . . . As it is now, 
the act penalizes the innocent more predictably than the guilty, 
and along with both, our competitiveness in world trade.
96
 
Issues explored during the House hearing included:  Clarifying the 
FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” and “instrumentality”; adding a 
compliance defense to the FCPA; successor liability issues; and DOJ 
decision-making in FCPA cases, including prosecutorial discretion and 
declination decisions.
97
 
The 2011 House hearing was much more contentious than the 
Senate’s 2010 FCPA hearing.  The House hearing reflected the growing 
divide between the legitimate concerns of many as to this new era of FCPA 
enforcement and the enforcement agencies’ seemingly “circle the wagons” 
approach when it comes to FCPA reform or critique of its FCPA 
enforcement program.  For instance, in closing the hearing, Chairman 
Sensenbrenner sternly told the DOJ witness that it “would behoove the 
[DOJ] to realize that this statute needs updating” because the current 
enforcement climate has caused U.S. business not to pursue legitimate 
business activity, thereby putting U.S. business at a significant 
disadvantage to foreign companies.
98
 
During the hearing, Chairman Sensenbrenner said that his Committee 
would be drafting an FCPA reform bill.
99
  The force with which the 
statement was made gave the impression that a reform bill would soon 
follow the hearing.  However, the much-anticipated reform bill was not 
introduced in 2011 and it is possible that Congress will delay introducing a 
reform bill until the DOJ issues its promised FCPA guidance in 2012.
100
 
 
 96.  Bill Brock, Editorial, Shifting Gears on Bribes Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1981, 
at E19. 
 97.  See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112TH CONG. 3-4 (2011), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.pdf. 
 98.  Id. at 75. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  In November 2011, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer announced that in 
2012 the DOJ hopes to “release detailed new guidance on the [FCPA’s] criminal and civil 
enforcement provisions.”  Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Address at the 26th 
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html.  DOJ guidance 
on the FCPA would be long-coming.  The FCPA’s 1988 amendments required that the 
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Whenever an FCPA reform bill is introduced, and whatever its 
specific provisions, FCPA reform in 2012 is far from a sure thing.  The 
topic is a political hot potato, particularly during an election season, and 
history instructs that substantive FCPA reform can drag on for many 
years.
101
 
While 2011 did not witness a comprehensive FCPA reform bill, the 
year did witness certain FCPA reform bills introduced on Capitol Hill.  
However, the bills, even if enacted, will likely have limited scope and 
application. 
 
Attorney General, “after consultation with the [SEC], the Secretary of Commerce, the 
United States Trade Representative, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and after obtaining the views of all interested persons through public notice and 
comment procedures, shall determine to what extent compliance with [the anti-bribery 
provisions] would be enhanced and the business community would be assisted by further 
clarification” of its various provisions.”  Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 
5003(d), Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1417 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
1) (2012).  Among other things, Congress requested that the Attorney General consider 
issuing guidelines as to “general precautionary procedures [companies] may use on a 
voluntary basis to conform their conduct to the Department of Justice’s present enforcement 
policy . . . .”  Id. § 5003(d)(2).  Following the 1988 Congressional mandate, the DOJ did 
issue a formal notice inviting all interested persons “to submit their views concerning the 
extent to which compliance with [the anti-bribery provisions] would be enhanced and the 
business community assisted by further clarification of the provisions of the anti-bribery 
provisions through the issuance of guidelines.”  Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,918 (Oct. 4, 1989).  However, the DOJ stated that 
“[o]nly 5 [sic] responses were received, and 3 [sic] of the responses were to the effect that 
guidelines were unnecessary.” Based on this information, it declined to issue FCPA 
compliance guidelines envisioned by Congress.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 
RECOMMENDATION (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusi 
ness/anti-briberyconvention/2390377.pdf.  In July 1990, the DOJ stated as follows:   
After consideration of the comments received, and after consultation with the 
appropriate agencies, the Attorney General has determined that no guidelines 
are necessary. . . . [C]ompliance with the [anti-bribery provisions] would not be 
enhanced nor would the business community be assisted by further clarification 
of these provisions through the issuance of guidelines.   
Anti-Bribery Provisions, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,694 (July 12, 1990). 
 101.  For instance, bills addressing the various substantive reforms in the FCPA’s 1988 
amendments were first introduced in Congress in 1980 and reform stalled for many years.  
See, e.g., Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 2763, 96th Cong. 
(1980); Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 708, 97th Cong. 
(1981); Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 414, 98th Cong. 
(1983); Foreign Trade Practices Act of 1983, H.R. 2157, 98th. Cong. (1983); Business 
Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 430, 99th Cong. (1985); Foreign Trade 
Practices Act of 1986, H.R. 4389, 99th Cong. (1986); Export Enhancement Act of 1986, 
H.R. 4708, 99th Cong. (1986); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, H.R. 3, 
100th Cong. (1987); Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987, S. 539, 99th Cong. 
(1987); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, S. 1420, 100th Cong. (1987). 
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In November 2011, Representative Ed Perlmutter (D-CO) introduced 
H.R. 3531 (the “Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011”).
102
  
Substantively similar to previous bills Perlmutter has introduced,
103
 H.R. 
3531 would authorize certain private causes of action for violations under 
the FCPA by foreign concerns that damage domestic business.  The bill 
would likely have limited application, as it seeks to amend only the 78dd-3 
prong of the FCPA that is applicable to conduct by “persons other than 
issuers or domestic concerns” and the prong that has the narrowest 
jurisdictional scope.  Thus, the bill’s application would be limited to 
instances in which a foreign company (one without shares listed on a U.S. 
exchange) “while in the territory” of the U.S., makes use of an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of a foreign bribery 
scheme that harms U.S. business. 
In December 2011, Representative Peter Welch (D-VT) introduced 
H.R. 3588 (“Overseas Contractor Reform Act”).
104
  Substantively similar to 
a bill that unanimously passed the House in 2010,
105
 H.R. 3588 states that 
“[i]t is the policy of the United States Government that no Government 
contracts or grants should be awarded to individuals or companies who 
violate the [FCPA] . . . .”
106
  This is a sound policy statement and a 
debarment penalty for egregious instances of corporate bribery involving 
high-level executives or board participation is in the public interest.  
However, the problem with H.R. 3588, as with the previous bill, is its 
trigger for debarment—“any person found to be in violation of the [FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provisions] shall be proposed for debarment . . . within 30 days 
after the judgment finding such person to be in violation becomes final.”
107
  
Given the DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs, as well as its discretion in 
charging decisions, few companies in this new era of FCPA enforcement 
are, as strange as it may sound, ever “found to be in violation of the 
FCPA.”
108
  For instance, as detailed in Table I above, in 2011, nine of the 
 
 102.  H.R. 3531, 112th Cong. (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr3531ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr3531ih.pdf. 
 103.  See Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 2152 111th Cong. 
(2009), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2152 (using language similar to 
its successor, H.R. 3531, authorizing certain private rights of action under the FCPA for 
foreign violations damaging domestic businesses). 
 104.  H.R. 3588, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billte 
xt.xpd?bill=h112-3588. 
 105.  Overseas Contractor Reform Act, H.R. 5366, 111th Cong. (2010), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr5366eh/pdf/BILLS-111hr5366eh.pdf. 
106.   H.R. 3588, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h112-3588. 
 107.  Id. 
108.   Id. 
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eleven DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions (eighty-two percent) 
were resolved with an NPA or DPA. 
Thus, Representative Welch’s bill again represents impotent 
legislation and demonstrates that few members of Congress understand 
how the FCPA is actually enforced, or if they do, that creating the illusion 
of addressing a problem is more important than actually addressing a 
problem. 
B. Judicial Scrutiny 
During the past decade of the FCPA’s resurgence, the DOJ has 
enforced the FCPA almost exclusively against cooperating corporate 
defendants after corporate voluntary disclosures.  The role of the judiciary 
has largely been limited to sentencing the few individual defendants 
charged with FCPA violations.  In many of those instances, judges 
significantly rejected the DOJ’s sentencing recommendations.
109
  Because 
of the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” settlement policy, it is even more 
rare for the judiciary to scrutinize the SEC’s enforcement of the FCPA.
110
  
However, one significant development from 2011, and one to follow in 
2012, is Judge Jed Rakoff’s (S.D.N.Y.) rejection of the SEC’s settlement 
policy in a non-FCPA case, and how the Second Circuit will rule in the 
appeal.
111
 
Judicial scrutiny of FCPA enforcement in 2011 included several cases 
of first impression and focused on:  “foreign official” issues; the FCPA’s 
knowledge element; the DOJ’s conduct in FCPA investigations and 
prosecutions; rulings in the Africa Sting cases, including as to jurisdictional 
issues; determining the victims of bribery; and use of the Travel Act to 
combat alleged commercial bribery. 
 
 109.  See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 137-38 (2011) (highlighting instances in the 
Western District of Virginia, Central District of California, and Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in which district judges rejected DOJ sentencing recommendations, and noting 
that this may signal “future judicial scrutiny regarding FCPA enforcement theories . . . .”). 
 110.  See Façade, supra note 1, at 942-44 (elaborating on the SEC’s “neither admit nor 
deny” policy and noting the general lack of judicial analysis of this policy). 
 111.  See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d, 336 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying the settlement between the parties by noting, among other things, 
that the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” settlement policy is “hallowed by history, but not 
by reason” and stating that the policy “deprives the Court of even the most minimal 
assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being asked to impose has any basis in 
fact”). 
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i. Foreign Official 
For many years, a significant percentage of FCPA enforcement 
actions have been based on the prosecution theory that state-owned or 
state-controlled enterprises (“SOEs”)—even those with publicly-traded 
shares and/or minority foreign government investment—are 
“instrumentalities” of a foreign government and that SOE employees are 
therefore “foreign officials” under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
112
 
As demonstrated by the below table, this trend continued in 2011 as 
approximately eighty percent of corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs.  These 
enterprises and entities ranged from manufacturing companies, oil and gas 
companies, telecommunications companies, healthcare entities, engineering 
firms, liquor stores, and insurance companies.  In 2011, a new minimum 
threshold was also advanced by the enforcement agencies for what 
constitutes an SOE.  The Comverse Technologies enforcement action 
detailed below focused on individuals connected to Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organization S.A. (“OTE”).  A review of OTE’s 
annual reports indicates that during the time period relevant to the 
enforcement action, the Greek government owned only between thirty-
three percent and thirty-eight percent of OTE.
113
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 112.  See Koehler, supra note 2, at 108-16 (showing that approximately sixty percent of 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2010 involved (in whole or in part) foreign officials 
who were employees of alleged SOEs); see also Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 410-12 
(2010) (showing that approximately sixty-six percent of corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions in 2009 involved, in whole or in part, foreign officials who were employees of 
alleged SOEs). 
 113.  Mike Koehler, “Foreign Official” Limbo—The Bar Has Been Lowered, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/foreign-official-limbo-the-bar-
has-been-lowered.  The largest category of investors in OTE during the relevant time period 
were international institutional investors. 
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            Table V - The “Foreign Officials” of 2011
114
 
 
Enforcement Action 
 
Alleged “Foreign Official” 
Maxwell Technologies DOJ
115
 
 “Pinggao Group Co. Ltd. 
(formerly Pingdingshan High 
Voltage Switch-gear Works) 
(‘Pinggao Group’) was a 
state-owned manufacturer of 
electric-utility infrastructure 
in Henan Province, People’s 
Republic of China (‘PRC’ or 
‘China’).” 
 “New Northeast Electric 
Shenygan HV 
Switchgear Co., Ltd. 
(‘Shenygang HV’) was a 
state-owned manufacturer of 
electric-utility infrastructure 
in Liaoning Province, PRC.” 
 “Xi-an XD High Voltage 
Apparatus Co., Ltd. a/k/a 
Xi’an Shinky High Voltage 
Electric Co., Ltd. (‘Xi-an 
XD’) was a state-owned 
manufacturer of electric 
utility infrastructure in 
Shaanxi Province, PRC.” 
 “[P]ayments . . . conveyed to 
officials of foreign 
 
 114.  This table is based on information from the DOJ or SEC’s actual charging 
documents.  As evident from the information in the table, in certain instances the 
enforcement agencies describe the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity; in other 
instances with virtually no specificity.  Some of the enforcement actions in the table 
technically involved only FCPA books and records and internal control charges.  However, 
actual charges in most FCPA enforcement actions hinge on voluntary disclosure, 
cooperation, collateral consequences, and other non-legal issues.  Thus, even if an FCPA 
enforcement action is resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges, the action remains very 
much about the “foreign officials” involved. 
 115.  Information at 4, United States v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 3:11-cr-00329-JM 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/c 
ases/maxwell/01-31-11maxwell-tech-info.pdf. 
KOEHLER__FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  1:51 PM 
30  U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
governments employed by 
state-owned entities, 
including Pinggao Group, 
Shenyang HV, and Xi-an 
XD . . . .” 
 
SEC
116
 
 Presumably the same as 
above, although the SEC 
complaint merely refers to 
“officials at several Chinese 
state-owned entities.” 
 
 
Tyson Foods DOJ
117
 
 “The Government of Mexico 
administers an inspection 
program, Tipo 
Inspeccion Federal (‘TIF’), 
for meat-processing 
facilities. . . .  The inspection 
program at each facility is 
supervised by an on-site 
veterinarian who is a 
government employee 
(‘“TIF veterinarian’”) paid by 
the state, who ensures that all 
exports are in conformity with 
Mexican health and safety 
laws.  Therefore, 
TIF veterinarians are foreign 
officials as defined by the 
FCPA . . . .” 
 “Wives of the TIF 
veterinarians.” 
 
 116.  Complaint at 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00258 
(D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp 
21832.pdf. 
 117.  Information at 3, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 1:11-cr-00037-RWR 
(D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tyson-
foods.html. 
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SEC
118
 
 Same as above. 
IBM Corp. SEC
119
 
 “[G]overnment officials in 
South Korea and China.” 
 “The foreign government 
officials involved worked for 
sixteen South Korean 
government entities 
(‘SKGE’).”; “Chief of 
Operations for the Electronic 
Operations Division of 
SKGE 1 . . . .; “[M]anager of 
the government-controlled 
SKGE 2 . . . .; “. . .SKGE 3’s 
Director of Planning . . . .”; 
“SKGE 4 was a state-owned 
agency of the South Korea 
government . . . an employee 
of SKGE 4 responsible for 
reviewing personal computer 
procurement bids . . . .”; 
“. . .Director of SKGE 5′s 
information technology 
department”;  
 “. . .Government Officials of 
SKGE 6″; “. . .[K]ey decision 
makers at ten other 
SKGEs . . . .” 
 “. . .Chinese government 
officials”; employees of 
“government-owned or 
controlled customers in 
China . . . .” 
Ball Corp. SEC
120
 
 
 118.  Complaint at 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00350-
RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011 
/comp21851.pdf. 
 119.  Complaint at 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 1:11-cv-
00563 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011 
/comp21889.pdf. 
 120.  Ball Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 64123, 2011 WL 1099562 (Mar. 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-64123.pdf. 
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 “[E]mployees of the 
Argentine government to 
secure the importation of 
prohibited used machinery 
and the exportation of raw 
materials at reduced tariffs.” 
 “[G]overnment customs 
officials . . . .” 
JGC of Japan DOJ
121
 
 “The Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation 
(‘NNPC’) was a Nigerian 
government-owned company 
charged with development of 
Nigeria’s oil and gas wealth 
and regulation of the 
country’s oil and gas 
industry.  NNPC was a 
shareholder in certain joint 
ventures with multinational 
oil companies.  NNPC was an 
entity and instrumentality of 
the Government of Nigeria 
and its officers and employees 
were ‘foreign officials’ within 
the meaning of the 
FCPA . . . .” 
 “Nigeria LNG Limited 
(‘NLNG’) was created by the 
Nigerian government to 
develop the Bonny Island 
Project and was the entity that 
awarded the related . . . 
contracts.  The largest 
shareholder of NLNG was 
NNPC, which owned 49% of 
NLNG.  The other owners of 
NLNG were multinational oil 
 
 121.  Information at 5, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/04-6-11jgc-
corp-info.pdf. 
092726E6-C225-41CF-9832-AC0ECA330BFDKOEHLER_FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  1:51 PM 
2012] FCPA UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 33 
 
companies.  Through the 
NLNG board members 
appointed by NNPC, among 
other means, the Nigerian 
government exercised control 
over NLNG, including but not 
limited to the ability to block 
the award of . . . contracts.  
NLNG was an entity and 
instrumentality of the 
Government of Nigeria and 
its officers and employees 
were ‘foreign officials’ within 
the meaning of the 
FCPA . . . .” 
 “[B]ribes to officials of the 
executive branch of the 
Government of Nigeria, 
officials of NNPC, officials of 
NLNG, and others.” 
 
Comverse Technologies DOJ
122
 
 “[I]ndividuals connected to 
OTE, including employees of 
OTE’s subsidiaries Cosmote, 
Cosmofon, and Cosmorom, in 
order to obtain purchase 
orders from those companies 
for Comverse Ltd. products 
and services . . . .” OTE is 
“Hellenic Telecommunic- 
ations Organization S.A. . . . a 
telecommunications provider 
controlled and partially 
owned by the Greek 
government.  The Greek 
government was OTE’s 
largest single shareholder and 
 
 122.  Non-Prosecution Agreement at 7, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Comverse Tech. Inc., 
(Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/rae-comverse/04-06-
11comverse-npa.pdf. 
KOEHLER__FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  1:51 PM 
34  U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
maintained an interest in over 
one-third of OTE’s issued 
share capital.” 
 
SEC
123
 
 Same as above. 
Johnson & Johnson DOJ
124
 
 “Greece has a national 
healthcare system wherein 
most Greek hospitals are 
publicly owned and operated.  
Health care providers who 
work at publicly-
owned hospitals (‘HCPs’) are 
government employees, 
providing health care services 
in their official capacities.  
Therefore, such HCPs in 
Greece are ‘foreign officials’ 
as that term is defined in the 
FCPA . . . .” 
 “Poland has a national 
healthcare system.  Most 
Polish hospitals are owned 
and operated by the 
government and most Polish 
HCPs [health care providers] 
are government employees 
providing health care services 
in their official capacities.  
Therefore, most HCPs in 
Poland are ‘foreign officials’ 
as defined by the FCPA.” 
 “The national healthcare 
 
 123.  Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Comverse Tech. Inc., No. 11-CV-1704-LDW 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/com 
p21920.pdf. 
 124.  Information, United States v. Depuy, Inc. No. 1:11-cr-000999-JDB (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-08-
11depuy-info.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Johnson & 
Johnson, (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-08-
11depuy-dpa.pdf. 
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system in Romania is almost 
entirely state-run.  The 
healthcare system is funded 
by the National Health Care 
Insurance Fund (‘CNAS’), to 
which employers and 
employees make mandatory 
contributions.  Most 
Romanian hospitals are 
owned and operated by the 
government and most 
HCPs in Romania are 
government employees.  
Therefore, most HCPs in 
Romania are ‘foreign 
officials’ as defined by the 
FCPA.” 
 
SEC
125
 
 Same as above. 
Tenaris DOJ
126 
 Employees of 
OJSC O’ztashqineftgaz (“OA
O”) “a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Uzbekneftegaz, 
the state holding company of 
Uzbekistan’s oil and gas 
industry.” 
 Employees of 
Uzbekekspertiza JSC, “an 
Uzbekistani government 
agency.” 
 
SEC
127
 
 Same as above. 
 
 125.  Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:11-cv-00686 
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp 
21922.pdf. 
 126.  Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tenaris, S.A., (May 
17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf. 
 127.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tenaris, S.A., 
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf. 
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Rockwell Automation SEC
128
 
 Employees of Chinese Design 
Institutes “which were 
typically state-owned 
enterprises that provided 
design engineering and 
technical integration services 
that can influence contract 
awards by end-user state-
owned customers” and 
employees of “other state-
owned companies.” 
Armor Holdings DOJ
129
 
 “[P]rocurement official of the 
United Nations . . . .” 
 
SEC
130
 
 Same as above. 
Cinergy Telecommunications DOJ
131
 
 “Telecommunications 
D’Haiti (‘Haiti Teleco’) was 
the Republic of Haiti’s state-
owned national 
telecommunications 
company.  Haiti Teleco was 
the only provider of non-
cellular telephone service to 
and from Haiti. . . . Patrick 
Joseph was the Director 
General of Haiti 
Teleco. . . . During his tenure 
at Haiti Teleco, Patrick 
Joseph was a ‘foreign official’ 
 
 128.   Rockwell Automation, supra note 21. 
 129.  Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, v. Armor Holdings, Inc., (July 
13, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/armor/07-31-11armor-
holdings.pdf. 
 130.  Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Armor Holdings, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-
01271  (D.D.C. July 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/c 
omp22037.pdf. 
 131.  Superseding Indictment, United States v. Washington Vasconez Cruz, No. 1:09-cr-
21010-JEM, 2011 WL 7655991 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2011). 
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. . . . Jean Rene Duperval was 
the Director of International 
Relations of Haiti Teleco. . . . 
During his tenure at Haiti 
Teleco, Duperval was a 
‘foreign official’ . . . . Official 
VJ was the Governor of the 
Banque de la Republique 
d’Haiti (‘“Bank of Haiti’”), 
the state-owned and state-
controlled central bank of 
Haiti. . . . During his tenure at 
the Bank of Haiti, Official VJ 
was a ‘foreign official’ . . . .” 
Bridgestone Corp. DOJ
132
 
 “[F]oreign government 
officials in Latin America and 
elsewhere” 
 “[E]mployees of state-owned 
entities . . . in Mexico and 
other Latin American 
countries;” employee at 
Petroleos Mexicanos (“PEME
X”). 
Diageo SEC
133
 
 “[V]arious government 
officials in India, Thailand, 
and South Korea . . . .” 
 “[H]undreds of Indian 
government officials 
responsible for purchasing or 
authorizing the sale of 
[Diageo’s] beverages.”  
 “[E]mployees of government 
liquor stores in and around 
New Delhi.” “[G]overnment 
 
 132.  Information, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00651 (S.D. Tex. 
Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bridgestone/ 
09-15-11bridgestone-information.pdf. 
 133.  Diageo plc, Exchange Act Release No. 64978, 2011 WL 3159087 (ALJ July 27, 
2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-
64978.pdf. 
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employees of the Indian 
military’s Canteen Stores 
Department.”  
 “[G]overnment officials in the 
North Region of India and in 
the State of Assam for the 
purpose of securing label 
registrations. . . .” 
 “[E]xcise officials to secure 
import permits and other 
administrative approvals.” 
 A “Thai government and/or 
political party 
official . . . [who] served as 
Deputy Secretary to the Prime 
Minister, Advisor to the 
Deputy Prime Minister, and 
Advisor to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives.  
The Thai Official also served 
on a committee of the ruling 
Thai Rak Thai political party, 
and as a member and/or 
advisor to several state-owned 
or state-controlled industrial 
and utility boards.” 
 South Korean customs 
officials, South Korean 
military officials, and other 
South Korean government 
officials 
Watts Water Technologies SEC
134
 
 Employees of certain Chinese 
state-owned design institutes. 
Aon DOJ
135
 
 “[G]overnment officials in 
 
 134.  Watts Water Techs, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 65555, 2011 WL 4860051 
(ALJ Oct. 13, 2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ad 
min/2011/34-65555.pdf. 
 135.  Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Aon Corp., (Dec. 20, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/aon/2011-12-20-aon-final-executed-
npa.pdf. 
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Costa Rica . . .” 
 Employees of 
“Instituto Nacional De 
Deguros (‘INS’), Costa Rica’s 
state-owned insurance 
company . . . .” 
 
SEC
136
 
 Same as above.  In addition, 
officials from an “Egyptian 
government-owned company, 
the Egyptian Armament 
Authority (‘EAA’), and its 
U.S. arm, the Egyptian 
Procurement Office (‘EPO’)”; 
“Vietnam Airlines, a 
Vietnamese government-
owned entity . . . .”  
 “BP Migas and Pertamina, 
two Indonesia state-owned 
entities in the oil and gas 
industry”  
 “Myanmar Airways (assured) 
and Myanmar Insurance 
(reinsured), two government-
owned entities”;  
 “Biman Bangladesh Airways 
(assured) and Sudharan Bima 
Corporation (reassured), two 
government-owned 
entities . . . .”  
 “[T]he son of a former high-
ranking government official 
in Bangladesh with several 
important political 
connections.” 
Magyar Telekom / Deutsche DOJ
137
 
 
 136.  Complaint, SEC v. Aon Corp., No. 1:11-cv-02256 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2011). 
 137.  Information at 4, 6-7, United States v. Magyar Telekom, Plc., No. 1:11CR00597 
(E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ma 
gyar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-magyar-telekom.pdf; see also Non-Prosecution 
Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:11CR-00597 (Dec. 29, 
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Telekom  “Telekom Crne Gore A.D., 
n/k/a ‘Crnogorski Telekom,’ 
(‘TCG’) and its mobile 
company subsidiary were, 
respectively, the Montenegrin 
state-owned fixed line and 
cellular telecommunications 
companies. . . . Before 
MAGYAR TELEKOM 
acquired TCG, it was 
controlled by the Government 
of Montenegro.  Accordingly, 
employees of TCG were 
‘foreign officials’ . . . .” 
 “Macedonian Political Party 
A and Macedonian Political 
Party B were political parties 
in the Macedonian governing 
coalition during 2005, among 
other times.  Each party 
represented a traditional ethic 
group in Macedonia.  As 
such, Macedonian Political 
Party A and Macedonian 
Political Party B were each a 
‘foreign political party’. . . .” 
 “Macedonian Official #1 was 
a high-ranking government 
official with responsibility 
related to telecommunications 
laws and regulations . . . and a 
leader of Macedonian 
Political Party A.  As such, 
Macedonian Official #1 was a 
‘foreign official’ and an 
official of a foreign political 
party . . . .” 
 “Macedonian Official #2 was 
a high-ranking government 
 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/deutsche-
telekom/2011-12-29-deustche-telekom-npa.pdf. 
092726E6-C225-41CF-9832-AC0ECA330BFDKOEHLER_FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  1:51 PM 
2012] FCPA UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 41 
 
official with responsibility for 
telecommunications laws and 
regulations . . . and a leader of 
Macedonian Political Party B.  
As such, Macedonian Official 
#2 was a ‘foreign official’ and 
an official of a foreign 
political party . . . .” 
 
SEC
138
 
 Same as above. 
 
The year 2011 witnessed three judicial challenges to the enforcement 
theory that employees of alleged SOEs are “foreign officials” under the 
FCPA.  These challenges relied in part on my declaration that was filed in 
February 2011 in connection with the below-described Carson enforcement 
action.
139
  The Carson “foreign official” challenge was the first in the 
 
 138.  See Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Magyar Telekom, Plc, No. 11 CIV 9646 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp 
22213-co.pdf. 
 139.  Koehler’s Carson Declaration, supra note 90, at 4, 6-7.  In sum, the declaration 
states as follows:   
There is no express statement or information in the FCPA’s legislative history 
describing the ‘any department, agency, or instrumentality’ portion of the 
‘foreign official’ definition.  Further, there is no express statement or 
information in the FCPA’s legislative history to support the DOJ’s expansive 
legal interpretation that alleged SOEs are ‘instrumentalities’ (or ‘departments’ 
or ‘agencies’) of a foreign government and that employees of SOEs are 
therefore ‘foreign officials’ under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  
However, there are several statements, events, and information in the FCPA’s 
legislative history that demonstrate that Congress did not intend the ‘foreign 
official’ definition to include employees of SOEs.   
Id. 
Among other things,  
During its multi-year investigation of foreign corporate payments that preceded 
enactment of the FCPA, Congress was aware of the existence of SOEs and that 
some of the questionable payments uncovered or disclosed may have involved 
such entities. . . . [I]n certain of the competing bills introduced in Congress to 
address foreign corporate payments, the definition of ‘foreign government’ 
expressly included SOEs,” and Congress was provided a more precise definition 
of “foreign government” to include SOEs.   
Id.  It further states that: 
However, despite being aware of SOEs, despite exhibiting a capability for 
drafting a definition that expressly included SOEs in other bills, and despite 
being provided a more precise way to describe SOEs, Congress chose not to 
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FCPA’s history that made use of a detailed and complete overview of the 
FCPA’s extensive legislative history on the “foreign official” element.
140
  
 
include such definitions or concepts in . . . the bill that ultimately became the 
FCPA . . . .   
Id.  The declaration was also relied upon in the Lindsey Manufacturing and O’Shea “foreign 
official” challenges discussed infra note 140 and 144. 
 140.  Prior to the Carson “foreign official” challenge, there were two previous “foreign 
official” challenges.  The first “foreign official” challenge in the FCPA’s history is believed 
to be in the Nguyen enforcement action brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
2009.  See Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal 
Offense and for Vagueness at *2-4, United States v. Nguyen, No. 2:08-cr-00522-TJS, 2009 
WL 3847470, (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2009) (explaining the grounds for Defendants’ “foreign 
official” challenge to the government’s FCPA enforcement action).  This challenge did not 
make extensive use of the FCPA’s detailed legislative history relevant to the “foreign 
official” issue.  In December 2009, U.S. District Court Judge Timothy Savage denied, 
without any analysis, the motion to dismiss in a one-paragraph order.  Order Denying 
Motion to Dismiss for Mootness, United States v. Nguyen, No. 2:08-cr-00522-TJS (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 3, 2009).  The second “foreign official” challenge in the FCPA’s history is believed to 
be the Joel Esquenazi enforcement action brought in the Southern District of Florida.  
Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness, 
United States v. Esquenazi, No. 1:09-cr-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2010).  The motion 
likewise did not contain a thorough analysis of the FCPA’s extensive legislative history on 
the “‘foreign official” element and was part of a series of motions filed to dismiss the 
indictment, some of which were inflammatory and appeared to lack even facial merit, such 
as selective and vindictive prosecution, that alleged racism by the government.  U.S. District 
Court Judge Jose Martinez denied the “foreign official” challenge in a cursory opinion 
devoid of substantive analysis, delivered approximately forty-eight hours after the DOJ’s 
response brief.  Order Denying Without Prejudice Motion in Limine as to Joel Esquenazi, 
No. 1:09-cr-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2010).  The substance of the opinion was as 
follows:  
The Court . . . finds that the Government has sufficiently alleged that Antoine 
and Duperval were foreign officials by alleging that these individuals were 
directors in the state-owned Haiti Teleco.  Any factual arguments Defendant has 
on this point may be addressed at trial. . . . The Court also disagrees that Haiti 
Teleco cannot be an instrumentality under the FCPA’s definition of foreign 
official.  The plain language of this statute and the plain meaning of this term 
show that as the facts are alleged in the indictment Haiti Teleco could be an 
instrumentality of the Haitian government. 
Order Denying Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 2-3, United States 
v. Esquenazi, No. 1:09-cr-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla. 2010), ECF No. 309 (internal citations 
omitted).  In August 2011, Esquenazi and co-defendant Carlos Rodriguez were found guilty 
of, among other things, FCPA offenses after a jury trial.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Two Telecommunications Executives Convicted by Miami Jury on All Counts for 
Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications 
Company in Haiti (Aug. 5, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/ 
11-crm-1020.html.  Defendants are appealing their conviction to the Eleventh Circuit and 
this appeal will be the first time in the FCPA’s history that the definition of “foreign 
official” will be squarely before a Circuit Court.  See infra note 151 (explaining grounds on 
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Although the Carson “foreign official” challenge was filed before the 
below-described Lindsey Manufacturing “foreign official” challenge, the 
briefing schedule in the latter case resulted in an earlier judicial decision. 
In April 2011, Judge Howard Matz (C.D. Cal.) held in an enforcement 
action involving Lindsey Manufacturing and its CEO and CFO (Keith 
Lindsey and Steven Lee) that “a state-owned corporation having the 
attributes of CFE (Comisión Federal de Electricidad, a Mexican utility) 
may be an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government within the meaning of 
the FCPA, and officers of such a state-owned corporation . . . may therefore 
be “foreign officials” within the meaning of the FCPA.”
141
 
Judge Matz identified the following “non-exclusive list” of “various 
characteristics of government agencies and departments that fall within 
[the] description [of instrumentality]”:  
[T]he entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in many 
cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction; [t]he key officers 
and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, government 
officials; [t]he entity is financed, at least in large measure, 
through governmental appropriations or through revenues 
obtained as a result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees 
or royalties, such as entrance fees to a national park; [t]he entity 
is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to 
administer its designated functions; [and t]he entity is widely 
perceived and understood to be performing official (i.e., 
governmental) functions.
142
   
As to the FCPA’s legislative history Judge Matz stated in dicta as 
follows: 
The [C]ourt finds that the legislative history of the FCPA is 
inconclusive.  Although it does not demonstrate that Congress 
intended to include all state-owned corporations within the ambit 
of the FCPA, neither does it provide support for Defendants’ 
insistence that Congress intended to exclude all such corporations 
from the ambit of the FCPA.
143
 
In early January 2012, Judge Lynn Hughes from the Southern District 
of Texas denied, without issuing a written decision, John Joseph O’Shea’s 
“foreign official” challenge in a case involving the same CFE entity at 
issue in the Lindsey enforcement action.
144
 
 
which defendants’ base their pending appeal). 
 141.  Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, United States v. Noriega, 
No. 2:10-cr-01031-AHM (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011), ECF No. 474. 
 142.  Id. at 9. 
 143.  Id. at 14. 
 144.  Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 6, 2012), 
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In May 2011, Judge James Selna in the Central District of California 
concluded in an enforcement action involving various former employees of 
Controlled Components Inc. (the “Carson” enforcement action) that “the 
question of whether state-owned companies qualify as instrumentalities 
under the FCPA is a question of fact . . . [and that] [s]everal factors bear on 
the question of whether a business entity constitutes a government 
instrumentality . . . .”
145
 
According to Judge Selna, those factors include the following: 
The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its 
employees; the foreign state’s degree of control over the entity; 
the purpose of the entity’s activities; the entity’s obligations and 
privileges under the foreign state’s law, including whether the 
entity exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its 
designated functions; the circumstances surrounding the entity’s 
creation; and the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, 
including the level of financial support by the state (e.g., 
subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).
146
 
Judge Selna stated that the above “factors are not exclusive, and no 
single factor is dispositive.”
147
  Rather, Judge Selna said that the “chief 
utility [of the factors] is simply to point out that several types of evidence 
are relevant when determining whether a state-owned company constitutes 
an ‘instrumentality’ under the FCPA—with state ownership being only one 
of several considerations.”
148
 
Despite these factors, Judge Selna also stated as follows: 
[M]ere monetary investment in a business entity by the 
government may not be sufficient to transform that entity into a 
governmental instrumentality.  But when a monetary investment 
is combined with additional factors that objectively indicate the 
entity is being used as an instrument to carry out governmental 
objectives, that business would qualify as a governmental 
 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-21.  However, on January 16, 2012, at trial 
after the close of the DOJ’s case, Judge Hughes granted O’Shea’s motion for acquittal and 
found him not guilty of all substantive FCPA charges.  See Mike Koehler, O’Shea Not 
Guilty of Substantive FCPA Charges, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/oshea-not-guilty-of-substantive-fcpa-charges (explaining the 
district court’s reasoning behind granting Defendant’s Motion for Acquittal on all 
substantive FCPA charges). 
 145.  Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5, United States v. Carson, No. 
8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011), ECF No. 373. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
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instrumentality.
149
 
As to the FCPA’s legislative history, Judge Selna found “that the 
statutory language of the FCPA is clear, that the statutory scheme is 
coherent and consistent, and that resort to the legislative history of the 
FCPA is unnecessary.”
150
 
Far from adding certainty to the “foreign official” element of an FCPA 
anti-bribery violation, the trial court decisions in 2011 created more 
confusion and uncertainty concerning a key element of an important law 
governing international business transactions.  In the minds of some, the 
“foreign official” challenges are over and the DOJ has prevailed, even if 
the trial court rulings have not completely endorsed various aspects of the 
DOJ’s position.  Yet, none of these decisions have precedential value and 
an important issue to monitor in 2012 is the Esquenazi/Rodriguez appeal to 
the Eleventh Circuit.
151
  This appeal will be the first time in the FCPA’s 
history that “foreign official” will be squarely before a Circuit Court. 
ii. Knowledge 
The year 2011 also witnessed a rare appellate court FCPA decision in 
arguably the most complex and convoluted case in the FCPA’s history.  
The case involves Frederic Bourke, who was a member of an investment 
consortium, and was criminally charged in 2005 along with others for 
making:  
a series of corrupt promises, payments, and offers of payments to 
senior officials of the Government of Azerbaijan in order to 
enable the investment consortium . . . to purchase vouchers and 
options and to bid at auction for interests in SOCAR 
[Azerbaijan’s national oil company] and other valuable Azeri 
State assets.
152
   
The case took several twists and turns as the FCPA substantive charges 
 
 149.  Id. at 7. 
 150.  Id. at 11–12. 
 151.  See Mike Koehler, Rodriguez Seeks Release Pending Historic Appeal, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/rodriguez-seeks-release-pending-
historic-appeal (explaining the grounds on which defendants base their pending appeal). 
 152.  Indictment at 10, United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693 (No. 1:05-cr-
00518-SAS) (S.D.N.Y. June, 21 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/f 
cpa/cases/kozenyv/05-12-05kozeny-indict.pdf; see also Andrew Longstreth, Azerbaijan 
Bribes Put One Mogul on Trial, Another in Exile, AM. LAW., Oct. 9, 2009, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202434399273&Azerbaij
an_Bribes_Put_One_Mogul_on_Trial_Another_in_Exile&slreturn=20120928222426 
(providing additional background on the case). 
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were originally dismissed on statute of limitations grounds,
153
 the 
substantive charges were later reinstated,
154
 and a superseding indictment 
was then filed in 2009 dropping the FCPA substantive charges.
155
  
Following a six-week jury trial before U.S. District Court Judge Shira 
Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.) in 2009, Bourke was found guilty of conspiracy to 
violate the FCPA and the Travel Act, and making false statements to the 
FBI.
156
  Bespeaking the complex nature of the case, in November 2009, 
Judge Scheindlin rejected the DOJ’s ten year sentencing recommendation 
and instead sentenced Bourke to 366 days in prison.
157
  In doing so, Judge 
Scheindlin stated:  “After years of supervising this case, it is still not 
entirely clear to me whether Mr. Bourke was a victim, or a crook, or a little 
bit of both.”
158
 
Bourke’s appeal largely focused on whether he had sufficient 
knowledge of the bribery scheme, challenging the trial court’s conscious 
avoidance jury instruction and other knowledge issues such as whether he 
acted “corruptly” and “willfully” and whether the trial court erred in failing 
to give a good faith jury instruction.
159
 
In December 2011, the Second Circuit affirmed Bourke’s conviction.  
Its decision on conscious avoidance is noteworthy in terms of FCPA 
jurisprudence.
160
  The court concluded that Bourke enabled himself to 
participate in a bribery scheme without acquiring actual knowledge of the 
specific conduct at issue and that there was ample evidence to support a 
conviction on a conscious avoidance theory.
161
  Among other things, the 
 
 153.  See United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(dismissing substantive FCPA charges). 
 154.  See id. at 714-15 (reinstating the claims against Bourke on the government’s 
Motion for Reconsideration). 
 155.  See Indictment, United States v. Bourke, No. 1:05-cr-00518-SAS (S.D.N.Y. May 
26, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/05-26-
09bourke2nd-supersed-indict.pdf. 
 156.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Connecticut Investor Found Guilty in 
Massive Scheme to Bribe Senior Government Officials in the Republic of Azerbaijan (July 
10, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-677.html. 
 157.  See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 28, United States v. Bourke, No. 1:05-cr-
00518-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2009), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 
122 (2d Cir. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/11-10-
09bourke-trans-hearing.pdf (providing the court’s reasoning behind rejection of the DOJ’s 
recommendation, in favor of a lesser sentence). 
 158.  Id. at 34. 
 159.  See Mike Koehler, Outlining Bourke’s Appeal, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/outlining-bourkes-appeal (reviewing Bourke’s direct appeal 
to the Second Circuit and parallel Rule 33 motion to the Southern District of New York). 
 160.  See United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 140 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 161.  See id. at 133 (explaining the evidence used by the court to support a conviction on 
a conscious avoidance theory). 
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Second Circuit noted that Bourke “was aware of how pervasive corruption 
was in Azerbaijan generally,” that he knew of his co-defendants’ shady 
reputation, that he created advisory companies “to shield himself and other 
American investors from potential liability from payments made in 
violation of [the] FCPA,” and that he otherwise “avoided learning whether 
corrupt payments were made.”
162
 
As to whether conscious avoidance can be supported primarily by 
circumstantial evidence, the Second Circuit stated as follows: 
It is not uncommon for a finding of conscious avoidance to be 
supported primarily by circumstantial evidence.  Indeed, the very 
nature of conscious avoidance makes it unlikely that the record 
will contain directly incriminating statements.  Just as it is rare to 
find direct record evidence of an employer stating, “I am not 
going to give you a raise because you are a woman,” it is highly 
unlikely a defendant will provide direct record evidence of 
conscious avoidance by saying, “Stop! I think you are about to 
discuss a crime and I want to be able to deny I know anything 
about it!”
163
 
The message to international investors from the Second Circuit’s 
Bourke decision should be clear—if a potential investment results in 
sleepless nights and fear of asking specific, direct questions because of the 
answers that might be received, there is probably a better use for the 
money.  Moreover, the Second Circuit’s Bourke decision is likely to further 
motivate current enforcement agency scrutiny of the relationship between 
financial firms and sovereign wealth funds as well as private equity 
investments in emerging markets.
164
 
iii. DOJ Conduct 
Following Judge Matz’s denial of the above-mentioned “foreign 
official” challenge in the Lindsey Manufacturing enforcement action, the 
defendants proceeded to trial and in May 2011, Lindsey Manufacturing, 
Keith Lindsey, and Steven Lee were found guilty of various FCPA charges 
after a five week jury trial.
165
  The DOJ called the verdict an “important 
 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 134. 
 164.  See, e.g., Dionne Searcey & Randall Smith, SEC Probes Banks, Buyout Shops 
Dealing With Sovereign Wealth Funds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2011, at C1 (detailing the 
SEC’s probe into whether banks and private equity firms violated the FCPA in their 
dealings with sovereign wealth funds). 
 165.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California Company, Its Two Executives and 
Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for Their 
Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mexico  
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milestone” in its FCPA enforcement efforts as Lindsey Manufacturing was 
the first company ever to be tried and convicted of FCPA offenses.
166
 
The milestone was short-lived, however, as Judge Matz, after months 
of legal wrangling, vacated the convictions and dismissed the indictment 
after finding numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
167
  In the 
words of Judge Matz, the instances of misconduct were so varied and 
occurred over such a long time period “that they add up to an unusual and 
extreme picture of a prosecution gone badly awry.”
168
  Judge Matz 
specifically cited the following missteps: 
[T]he Government team allowed a key FBI agent to testify 
untruthfully before the grand jury, inserted material falsehoods 
into affidavits submitted to magistrate judges in support of 
applications for search warrants and seizure warrants, improperly 
reviewed e-mail communications between one Defendant and her 
lawyer, recklessly failed to comply with its discovery obligations, 
posed questions to certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s 
rulings, engaged in questionable behavior during closing 
argument and even made misrepresentations to the Court.
169
 
Prosecutorial misconduct findings logically focus on specific actions 
by specific actors, and one reading of Judge Matz’s decision is that it will 
have little impact on future FCPA enforcement.  Yet another plausible read 
is that Judge Matz’s decision was based, in part, on the quality of the 
DOJ’s case in the first instance.  For example, in addition to criticizing the 
DOJ’s willful blindness instruction and other aspects of the DOJ’s trial 
positions, Judge Matz, in setting forth reasons why the DOJ’s conduct 
prejudiced the defendants, noted the “weakness” of the DOJ’s case and 
how it was “far from compelling.”
170
  He stated as follows: 
Dr. Lindsey and Mr. Lee were put through a severe ordeal.  
Charges were filed against them as a result of a sloppy, 
incomplete and notably over-zealous investigation, an 
investigation that was so flawed that the Government’s lawyers 
tried to prevent inquiry into it.  In some instances motives, 
statements and conduct were attributed to them that were wholly 
unfounded or were obtained unlawfully . . . . The financial costs 
 
(May 10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-596.html. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Aguilar Noriega, 831 F. Supp. 
2d 1180, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 2:10-cr-01031-AHM). 
 168.  Id. at 1185. 
 169.  Id. at 1182. 
 170.  Id. at 1207.  Post-trial motions as to sufficiency of the evidence and based on 
various FCPA elements were pending, but were rendered moot by Judge Matz’s decision. 
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of the investigation and trial were immense, but the emotional 
drubbing [that Lindsey and Lee] absorbed undoubtedly was even 
worse.  As for [Lindsey Manufacturing], the very survival of that 
small, once highly-respected enterprise has been placed in 
jeopardy.
171
 
Whatever impact Judge Matz’s decision may have on FCPA 
enforcement in the future, this much is clear—the DOJ’s record in 
corporate FCPA trials stands at 0-2.
172
 
iv. Africa Sting Rulings 
In 2011, the DOJ’s manufactured Africa Sting case, in which FBI 
agents posed as procurement officials representing the President of 
Gabon,
173
 was also subjected to intense scrutiny and the results of that 
scrutiny were not positive for the DOJ. 
Given the number of individuals charged, the defendants were 
separated into four groups for trial and the first Africa Sting trial was held 
 
 171.  Id. at 1209. 
 172.  See Mike Koehler, One Win, One Loss, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 16, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/one-win-one-loss (summarizing the FCPA trial of Harris 
Corporation and its management).  In 1990, Harris Corporation (“Harris”) and its 
executives, John Iacobucci and Ronald Schultz, were criminally charged in connection with 
business conduct in Colombia.  Specifically, the defendants were charged with making 
payments to influence officials to award government telecommunications contracts to Harris 
in violation of the FCPA.  Harris, Iacobucci, and Schultz put the DOJ to its burden of proof 
and the criminal trial began in March 1991.  At the close of the DOJ’s case, Judge Charles 
Legge (N.D. Cal.) granted the defendants’ motion for acquittal, concluding that no 
reasonable jury could convict the company or its executives of the charged counts. 
 173.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of 
Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme 
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-crm-048.html.  The twenty-
two individuals charged worked in the military and law enforcement products industry and 
the DOJ employed undercover law enforcement tactics, with the assistance of an individual 
who previously plead guilty to unrelated FCPA offenses, in charging the defendants.  Per 
the DOJ’s own admission, the “scheme was part of [an] undercover operation, with no 
actual involvement from any minister of defense.”  See generally Mike Koehler, Africa 
Sting – The Charges, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/afric 
a-sting-the-charges (summarizing the indictments of the individuals implicated in the Africa 
Sting and their ensnarement by the FBI); see also Mike Koehler, Africa Sting – “Individual 
1” Identified . . . and Charged . . . In a Different Case, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 23, 2010), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/africa-sting-individual-1-identified-and-charged-in-a-
different-case (discussing FBI cooperator Richard Bistrong’s indictment in a bribe scheme 
wholly separate from the Africa Sting); Del Quentin Wilber, Off-Color Communiques Taint 
FBI Sting in Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2012, at A01 (describing indecent text messages 
between federal law enforcement agents and an informant, and defense attorneys’ 
exploitation of the impropriety of the communications). 
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during the summer of 2011.  In the first trial, Judge Richard Leon (D.D.C.) 
ordered, in a decision from the bench, what is believed to be the first-ever 
judicial ruling on the jurisdictional reach of the 78dd-3 prong of the 
FCPA.
174
  This prong was added to the FCPA by the 1998 amendments and 
applies to “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns” and provides 
the following jurisdictional requirement:  “while in the territory” of the 
U.S. the person corruptly made use of the mails or any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of a bribery 
scheme.
175
  When listing reasons why FCPA enforcement has increased 
during the past decade, the 78dd-3 prong of the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions is surely on the list as several recent enforcement actions have 
been based on increasingly aggressive enforcement theories that have been 
ripe for judicial scrutiny for many years.
176
 
During the first Africa Sting trial, Judge Leon granted defendant 
Pankesh Patel’s (a U.K. citizen) Rule 29 acquittal motion at the end of the 
DOJ’s case as to an FCPA substantive charge premised on his sending a 
DHL package—containing a purchase agreement in furtherance of the 
alleged corrupt scheme— from the U.K. to the U.S.
177
  Calling the DOJ’s 
jurisdictional theory “novel” and noting that there was no case law to 
support it, Judge Leon dismissed the charge against Patel, as well as certain 
 
 174.  See Mike Koehler, Significant dd-3 Development in Africa Sting Case, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (June 9, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/significant-dd-3-development-in-
africa-sting-case (quoting extensively from hearing transcript in which a skeptical Judge 
Leon questioned whether each act has to occur “while in the territory of the United States”). 
 175.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2006). 
 176.  See, e.g., Information, United States v. DaimlerChrysler Auto. Russia SAO, No. 
1:10-cr-00064-RJL (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fr 
aud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerrussia-info.pdf (alleging that Daimler’s wholly-
owned German-based subsidiary made improper payments to Russian government officials, 
that passed through the United States via interstate wires and sham companies established in 
the United States); Information, United States v. Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH, 
No. 1:10-cr-00065-RJL (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerexp-info.pdf 
(alleging that Daimler’s wholly-owned German-based subsidiary made improper payments 
to Croatian government officials that passed through sham companies incorporated in the 
United States);  Information, United States v. DaimlerChrysler China Ltd., No. 1:10-cr-
00066-RJL (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerchina-info.pdf 
(alleging that Daimler’s wholly-owned Beijing-based subsidiary made improper payments 
to Chinese government officials that passed through the United States); Information, United 
States v. SSI Int’l Far East, Ltd., No. 3:06-cr-00398-KI (D. Or. Aug. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ssi-intl/10-10-06ssi-information.pdf 
(alleging that SSI’s wholly-owned South Korean-based subsidiary made improper payments 
to Chinese and Korean government officials that were authorized by U.S. officers at SSI). 
 177.  Transcript of Trial, United States v. Goncalves, No. 1:09-cr-00335-RJL (D.D.C. 
June 6, 2011). 
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other charges against the other defendants.
178
 
The DOJ’s jurisdictional defeat turned out to be just the beginning of 
its struggles in the Africa Sting case.  In July 2011, Judge Leon declared a 
mistrial as to all remaining counts against Patel, Andrew Bigelow, John 
Benson Wier, and Lee Allen Tolleson after the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict.
179
  However, the DOJ’s difficulties did not stop with the first Africa 
Sting case.  In the manufactured case’s second trial, Judge Leon dismissed, 
among other charges, the DOJ’s conspiracy charge against all defendants 
(John Mushriqui, Jeana Mushriqui, Patrick Caldwell, Stephen Giordanella, 
John Godsey, and Mark Morales) finding that the DOJ failed to produce 
“sufficient evidence to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that each of [the] six defendants participated in the 
overarching conspiracy charged . . . .”
180
  Because the conspiracy charge 
was the only charge against Giordanella, he was exonerated as a result of 
Judge Leon’s ruling.
181
  Additional Africa Sting trials are scheduled in 2012 
and how the DOJ fares in those trials will be a significant story in 2012. 
v. Victims of Bribery 
If bribery is not a victimless crime, as many including the DOJ 
frequently state,
182
 then why do FCPA fines and penalties go directly into 
the U.S. Treasury with no apparent effort to identify and compensate the 
victims of FCPA violations?  A judicial challenge in 2011 raised this 
interesting and legitimate issue. 
In May 2011, Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica 
(“ICE”) petitioned for victim status of Alcatel-Lucent’s wide-ranging 
bribery scheme.
183
  The petition followed the December 2010 
 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See Mike Koehler, First Africa Sting Trial Results in Mistrial, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(July 8, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/first-africa-sting-trial-results-in-mistrial 
(noting the implications of a hung jury for the merits of the DOJ’s case). 
 180.  Transcript of Trial at 5, United States v. Goncalves, No. 1:09-cr-00335-RJL 
(D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2011). 
 181.  Id. at 9. 
 182.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California Company, Its Two 
Executives and Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for 
Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mexico 
(May 10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-596.html (“Bribery is not 
a victimless crime . . . .”); see also Alexandra Wrage, Paying the Fox to Buy New Chickens, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandra-
wrage/paying-the-fox-to-buy-new_b_647837.html (stating that “[c]ompensating the victims 
of corruption is a hot new topic” and that “[r]estitution to victims is hard not to like” but 
noting that the DOJ “does not attempt to compensate victims of bribery”). 
 183.  Petition for Relief Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) and Objection to Plea 
KOEHLER__FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  1:51 PM 
52  U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
announcement that Alcatel-Lucent and certain subsidiaries agreed to 
resolve a wide-ranging FCPA enforcement action, including conduct in 
Costa Rica involving payments to ICE officials.
184
  Even though ICE 
acknowledged that “three disloyal and corrupt [ICE] Directors and two 
disloyal and corrupt employees” were the recipients of Alcatel Lucent’s 
bribe payments, it nevertheless claimed it was a victim because the corrupt 
activities of Alcatel-Lucent caused the company “massive losses” and 
“catastrophic harm.”
185
  ICE argued that it was universally recognized that 
a victim includes an entity whose employees accept improper benefits to 
affect corporate decisions and that it was “nonsense” for an entity to be 
considered an active participant in a bribery scheme just because five of its 
16,500 employees were implicated.
186
  In opposition, the DOJ argued that 
given the “profound and pervasive corruption at the highest levels of ICE, 
the government does not believe it is appropriate to consider ICE a victim,” 
and that “it does not follow that the state-owned entity at which corruption 
was so pervasive in the tender process should now be permitted status as a 
victim or awarded restitution . . . .”
187
 
ICE’s petition was factually difficult from the start and it is not 
surprising that ICE did not prevail at the trial court level or in its writ of 
mandamus to the Eleventh Circuit.
188
  Yet, ICE’s petition did succeed in 
 
Agreement and Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 
1:10-cr-20907-MGC (S.D. Fla. dismissed May 31, 2011). 
 184.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries 
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec. 27, 
2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crm-1481.html.  The DOJ alleged 
that ICE was a “wholly state-owned telecommunications authority in Costa Rica responsible 
for awarding and administering public tenders for telecommunications contracts” and that 
ICE officers, directors, and employees were thus “foreign officials” under the FCPA.  
Information ¶ 13, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 1:10-cr-20907-MGC (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-
etal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf. 
 185.  Petition for Relief Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) and Objection to Plea 
Agreement and Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 12, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent 
S.A., No. 1:10-cr-20907-MGC (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2011). 
 186.  Victim Instituto Constrarricense de Electricidad’s Memorandum of Law In Support 
of Petition for Relief Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) and Objection to Plea Agreement 
and Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 1:10-
cr-20907-MGC (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2011). 
 187.  Government’s Response to ICE’s Petition for Victim Status and Restitution at 3, 4, 
United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 1:10-cr-20906-MGC (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2011). 
 188.  See Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida at 2, In re Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad, 
No. 1:10-cr-20906-MGC (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2011) (holding that the “district court did not 
clearly err in finding that [ICE] . . . actually functioned as the offenders’ coconspirator” and 
that the district court did not “err in finding that ICE failed to establish that it was directly 
and proximately harmed by the offenders’ criminal conduct”). 
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raising victim issues in FCPA enforcement actions and caused those 
interested in bribery and corruption issues to ponder the valid and 
legitimate questions of victims a bit more closely. 
vi. Travel Act 
The FCPA is not the only tool the DOJ has used to charge alleged 
foreign bribery schemes.  After all, application of the FCPA requires a 
“foreign official” and not all foreign bribery schemes involve a “foreign 
official.”  With increasing frequency, the DOJ charges—often in 
conjunction with FCPA offenses—Travel Act violations when the conduct 
at issue lacks a “foreign official,” yet concerns allegations of foreign 
commercial bribery. 
Enacted in 1961 prior to the FCPA, the Travel Act is part of the 
racketeering chapter of the U.S. criminal code and prohibits interstate and 
foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises.
189
  
Specifically, the Travel Act prohibits travel in interstate or foreign 
commerce or use of the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign 
commerce with intent to, among other things, carry on “any unlawful 
activity” which is defined to include bribery in violation of state law.
190
  
Approximately thirty states have laws that “generally prohibit giving 
anything of value to an individual for the purpose of influencing the 
individual’s conduct in work-related matters without the consent of the 
recipient’s employer or in breach of a duty.”
191
 
California is one such state with a law prohibiting commercial 
bribery,
192
 and in the Carson enforcement action described above in 
connection with the “foreign official” challenges, the DOJ—in addition to 
FCPA charges based on alleged payments to employees of various SOEs—
also charged Travel Act violations based on allegations of payments to 
employees of private companies in China and Russia.
193
 
 
 189.  18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  John Rupp & David Fink, Foreign Commercial Bribery and the Long Reach of 
U.S. Law, 6 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS-CORPORATE AND M&A LAW 3, Jan. 11, 2012, at 1, 
available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/6f93a9ee-340d-49b3-83fe-
252d3ddc8ced/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5af5fff4-f264-42f2-aace-
2781d6869cd9/Foreign_Commercial_Bribery_and_the_Long_Reach_of_U.S._Law.pdf. 
 192.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3 (Deering 2012) (providing that “any employee who 
solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept money . . . is guilty of commercial bribery”). 
 193.  See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Carson, No. SACR09-0077, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 154145 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 
cases/carsons/04-08-09carson-indict.pdf (alleging additional charges based on payments to 
employees of private companies in China and Russia). 
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In June 2011, certain Carson defendants moved to dismiss the Travel 
Act charges.
194
  Defendants’ principal arguments were the following:  (i) 
“In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. [. . .] the Supreme Court 
explained that unless Congress has clearly indicated that a statute applies 
extraterritorially, it does not” and that Travel Act application to the foreign 
bribery alleged in [the] case violate[d] Morrison’s presumption against the 
extraterritoriality of U.S. law; and (ii) “[t]he government’s recent 
application of th[e] fifty-year old statute against foreign commercial 
bribery, in the face of strong skepticism that it even applies, shows the 
enforcement of this statute is arbitrary.”
195
  As to this later issue, defendants 
argued that “[c]onsideration of the Travel Act in conjunction with the 
subsequently enacted FCPA also demonstrates that Congress did not intend 
that the Travel Act extend to foreign bribery.”
196
 
The DOJ’s principal arguments in opposition were the following:  (i) 
“[b]ecause the majority of defendants’ unlawful conduct was based in the 
United States, the statutes at issue [the Travel Act and California’s 
commercial bribery statute] reach defendants’ conduct without resort to 
extraterritorial application” since all of the defendants were U.S. citizens, 
served as executives at the company’s California headquarters, and that a 
“significant portion of the four defendants’ acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy occurred either in the United States or through communications 
with individuals in the United States”; and (ii) “[a]lthough the Court need 
not consider the question of whether the Travel Act applies 
extraterritorially, the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, 
and the case law all indicate that the Travel Act does apply 
extraterritorially.”
197
 
In August 2011, in a case of first impression, Judge Selna denied 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.
198
  In sum, Judge Selna concluded that:  (i) 
“an extraterritorial analysis is unnecessary under Morrison because the 
criminal offense was completed domestically”; and (ii) “even if an 
extraterritorial analysis is implicated, the Travel Act counts are 
proper . . . .”
199
  As to the later issue, an issue of broader significance, Judge 
 
 194.  Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One, Eleven, Twelve 
and Fourteen of the Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, 
United States v. Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011). 
 195.  Id. at 1-2. 
 196.  Id. at 2. 
 197.  Government’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One, Eleven, 
Twelve and Fourteen of the Indictment, Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 1, 3, 
United States v. Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2011). 
 198.  Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 11, 12 and 14 of the 
Indictment, United States v. Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011). 
 199.  Id. at 5. 
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Selna concluded that the “plain language of the Travel Act demonstrates 
Congress’s desire to reach conduct overseas.”
200
  As to defendants’ 
argument that subsequent enactment of the FCPA provided an inference 
that the Travel Act was not intended to apply extraterritorially, Judge Selna 
observed that “multiple criminal statutes can often be applied to the same 
criminal conduct” and he did “not discern any conflict between the Travel 
Act and the FCPA.”
201
 
As commentators have noted, with the recent passage of the U.K. 
Bribery Act, a law that contains FCPA-like provisions as well as 
provisions, unlike the FCPA, prohibiting commercial bribery, increased 
attention will be paid to foreign commercial bribery and the Carson Travel 
Act decision may motivate the DOJ in the future to bring purely 
commercial foreign bribery cases.
202
 
From a litigation standpoint, FCPA followers had much to keep track 
of in 2011 and the past year was a refreshing change from most previous 
years during which the enforcement agencies’ conduct and prosecution 
theories were seldom the subject of meaningful judicial scrutiny.  While it 
is tempting to score 2011 losses and victories (and to be sure, the DOJ had 
several victories in 2011, including jury trial verdicts against Joel 
Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez along with the record-setting sentence of 
Esquenazi),
203
 the past year demonstrates that subjecting FCPA 
enforcement actions to greater judicial scrutiny is in the public interest and 
that more corporate and individual FCPA defendants, despite motivating 
factors to the contrary,
204
 could benefit from mounting legal defenses and 
holding the enforcement agencies to its high burdens of proof in FCPA 
enforcement actions. 
 
 200.  Id. at 9. 
 201.  Id. at 11 n.9. 
 202.  See Rupp & Fink, supra note 191, at 1 (“To be sure, foreign commercial bribery is 
not yet a primary focus of U.S. enforcement activity. . . . But a move by U.S. authorities to 
target commercial bribery robustly is . . . a distinct possibility.”). 
 203.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for 
Scheme to Briber Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct. 25, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-crm-1407.html; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Two Telecommunications Executives Convicted by Miami Jury on All 
Counts for Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned 
Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/ 
August/11-crm-1020.html. 
 204.  See Façade, supra note 1, at 923-27 (describing the dynamics which result in little 
or no judicial scrutiny of most FCPA enforcement actions). 
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C. Other Scrutiny 
FCPA scrutiny in 2011 was not limited to Congress and the judiciary.  
As FCPA enforcement has increased, and as enforcement theories have 
become more aggressive, the FCPA has rightly attracted interest from a 
variety of sources including academics, the press and public interest 
groups. 
In July 2011, the FCPA made headlines around the world in 
connection with the News Corporation (“News Corp.”) scandal— 
specifically, allegations that News Corp. employees and agents provided 
cash or other things of value to London police officers to obtain non-public 
information that better allowed News Corp. entities to publish stories and 
thus sell more newspapers.
205
  Media coverage of News Corp.’s potential 
FCPA exposure shined a much needed light on the FCPA’s current era and 
raised two distinct, yet related, questions:  (i) whether, given the 
enforcement agencies’ current enforcement theories, the London police 
officer payments could expose News Corp. to FCPA liability; and (ii) 
whether Congress intended the FCPA to apply to the numerous FCPA 
enforcement actions in this new era that have nothing to do with obtaining 
or retaining foreign government contracts. 
The answer to the first question is a clear yes, as several FCPA 
enforcement actions have been based on payments to customs officials, tax 
officials, immigration officials and the like where the payments have 
nothing to do with “obtaining or retaining business” with a foreign 
government, but rather, the payments were alleged to have assisted the 
payor in “obtaining or retaining” business in the general sense.
206
 
The answer to the second question is subject to much debate.  The 
FCPA’s original definition of “foreign official” excluded “any employee of 
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof 
whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.”
207
  This was the 
FCPA’s original (albeit indirect) facilitating payment exception.  The 
relevant House Report states in pertinent part as follows: 
[A] gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of 
a customs document would not be reached by the bill.  Nor would 
it reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the 
 
 205.  See, e.g., Dominic Rushe & Jill Treanor, James Murdoch Could Face Criminal 
Charges on Both Sides of the Atlantic, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jul/08/james-murdoch-criminal-charges-phone-
hacking (reporting on News Corp.'s legal scrutiny in both the U.K. and U.S.). 
 206.  See Façade, supra note 1, at 972-97 (discussing recent FCPA enforcement actions 
involving foreign licenses, permits, applications, certifications, and customs and tax duties). 
 207.  Koehler’s Carson Declaration, supra note 90, at 90. 
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expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially 
ministerial or clerical nature which must . . . be performed in any 
event.
208
 
When Congress amended the FCPA in 1988, among other things, the 
definition of foreign official was amended by removing this indirect 
facilitating payment exception from the “foreign official” definition by 
creating a stand-alone facilitating payment exception currently found in the 
statute.
209
  In converting the FCPA’s de facto facilitating payment 
exception to an express facilitating payment exception, Congress did not 
seek to disturb its original intent.  The relevant House Report states as 
follows: 
The policy adopted by Congress in 1977 remains valid, in terms 
of both U.S. law enforcement and foreign relations 
considerations.  Any prohibition under U.S. law against this type 
of petty corruption would be exceedingly difficult to enforce, not 
only by U.S. prosecutors but by company officials themselves.  
Thus while such payments should not be condoned, they may 
appropriately be excluded from the reach of the FCPA.  U.S. 
enforcement resources should be devoted to activities that have 
much greater impact on foreign policy.
210
 
Many who commented on News Corp.’s potential FCPA exposure 
raised valid and legitimate concerns that the enforcement agencies have 
been “applying the law ever more broadly—to conduct that has little 
connection to obtaining government contracts or other government 
benefits, such as product approvals, permits or licenses”
211
 and that the 
enforcement agencies “have been attempting to extend their enforcement to 
include any payments that have nothing to do with foreign government 
procurement.”
212
 
Yet, the issue of whether current FCPA enforcement theories align 
with congressional intent in enacting the FCPA could be asked on a wide 
variety of issues.
213
  Such questions have long been asked by those who 
 
 208.  H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977). 
 209.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2006) (providing an exception for payments intended to 
expedite or ensure routine governmental action). 
 210.  H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 2, at 76-77 (1987). 
 211.  David Rivkin Jr. & Lee Casey, Payments and News-Gathering: The New First 
Amendment Threat, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2011, at A19. 
 212.  Editorial, News and Its Critics, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/a 
rticle/SB10001424052702303661904576451812776293184.html?mod=djkeyword. 
 213.  See, e.g., Façade, supra note 1 (discussing whether many current FCPA 
enforcement theories align with congressional intent); see also Koehler’s Carson 
Declaration, supra note 90, at 90 (providing an overview of legislative history relevant to 
the FCPA's “foreign official” element). 
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devote their professional careers to the FCPA, but the News Corp. scandal, 
and its potential FCPA scrutiny, succeeded like no other episode in the 
FCPA’s history in focusing broad attention to this new era of FCPA 
enforcement.  As News Corp.’s potential FCPA exposure and other similar 
examples also make clear, as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth anniversary, 
the statute seems to be used with increasing frequency by the enforcement 
agencies to address corporate ethics in general.
214
 
If an all-purpose corporate ethics statute is indeed the policy goal that 
the United States seeks to advance through FCPA enforcement, such a 
decision is best left to Congress to effectuate through a change in the 
statute, not for the enforcement agencies to effectuate through corporate 
charging decisions that are largely insulated from judicial scrutiny.
215
 
The current aggressive FCPA enforcement environment and calls for 
FCPA reform also prompted several bar organizations and civil society 
organizations to publicly weigh in on the issues.  In October 2011, a 
proposed resolution supported by the current and incoming chairs of the 
American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Section was 
presented to ABA Section Council Members.
216
  By its terms, the draft 
resolution calls for targeted FCPA reform in an effort to increase the 
statute’s transparency and fairness and to remove specific areas of textual 
ambiguity.
217
  For instance, the draft resolution calls on Congress to 
provide a definition for the term “instrumentality [of a foreign 
government],” to consider a UK Bribery Act-style compliance defense to 
protect companies against the difficult-to-control acts of rogue 
 
 214.  For instance, the Tyson Foods FCPA enforcement action involved Mexican 
veterinarians lawfully employed at the company’s Mexican plant who were responsible for 
certifying product for export.  Non-business payments were allegedly made to the 
veterinarians.  However, the charging documents do not give any detail as to how the 
payments sought to influence the veterinarians nor do the charging documents suggest that 
the product at issue was not qualified for export.  In fact, Tyson’s press release (a release the 
DOJ had to approve per the deferred prosecution agreement) states that there were no issues 
with the safety of the exported product.  See Mike Koehler, Tyson Foods Settle FCPA 
Enforcement Action Involving Mexican Veterinarians and Their No-Show Wives, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/tyson-foods-settles-fcpa-
enforcement-action-involving-mexican-veterinarians-and-their-no-show-wives (questioning 
whether the FCPA’s “obtain or retain business” element still has significance). 
 215.  See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010) (stating 
that the court’s function is to give a statute “the effect its language suggests, however 
modest that may be; not to extend it to admirable purposes it might be used to achieve”). 
 216.  See Mike Koehler, ABA Ponders FCPA Reform, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/aba-ponders-fcpa-reform (reporting on the presentation of an 
ABA Resolution to reform the FCPA). 
217.   Resolution, American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section, Report to the 
House of Delegates (on file with author).   
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employees/transaction partners, and to limit criminal liability based on 
theories of successor liability.
218
  Although the draft resolution applauds the 
work done by DOJ and the SEC to ensure that anti-corruption laws are 
taken seriously and to lead the global push for greater anti-corruption 
compliance, it warns of the danger that because of the FCPA’s loose 
drafting, it lends itself to being transformed from a criminal proscription 
carrying moral condemnation to a public welfare offense less likely to deter 
future misconduct.
219
 
However, the mere discussion of FCPA reform was opposed by many 
civil society organizations in 2011.  Viewing FCPA reform from a 
simplistic either-you-are-against-bribery-or-for-bribery position, civil 
society groups have suggested that “for the U.S. to roll back any of its 
ground-breaking anti-bribery law at this critical juncture when the rest of 
the world is finally starting to match its standards, would be an abdication 
of its leadership role on this important issue.”
220
 
In September 2011, the George Soros-funded Open Society 
Foundations released a white paper titled Busting Bribery: Sustaining the 
Global Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“Busting 
Bribery”).
221
  Positioned as a response to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 
October 2010 white paper titled Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments 
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
222
 Busting Bribery asserted that the 
 
 218.  Id. at 3-5. 
 219.  See id. at 4 (describing how ABA proposal is “based on the basic criminal law 
principle that there should be no liability for a company that did not act in concert with the 
bad actor, and that, therefore, possessed no ‘guilty mind’”). 
 220.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 80 (2011) 
(written testimony of Global Witness). 
 221.  DAVID KENNEDY & DAN DANIELSEN, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS, BUSTING BRIBERY: 
SUSTAINING THE GLOBAL MOMENTUM OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 39 (2011), 
available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Busting%2520Brib 
ery2011September.pdf.  George Soros is the chairman of Soros Fund Management LLC.  
Busting Bribery asserts that corporations that resolve FCPA enforcement actions have a 
“bad or wrongful purpose,” that current standards “simply do not permit successful 
prosecution of innocent, mistaken or unknowing persons” and that companies involved in an 
FCPA enforcement action are corrupt.  Id. at 39 (internal quotation omitted).  While 
misguided, if the Soros-funded Open Society Foundations believes in such statements, it is 
interesting to note that Soros Fund Management LLC invests in numerous FCPA violators 
or companies subject to FCPA scrutiny.  See Mike Koehler, Why Does George Soros Invest 
in So Many FCPA Violators?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor 
.com/why-does-george-soros-invest-in-so-many-fcpa-violators (commenting on Soros Fund 
Management LLC’s recent 13F filing, which documented investments in companies under 
FCPA scrutiny). 
 222.  ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 7 (2010), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform. 
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“FCPA is working as Congress intended and new legislation is neither 
necessary nor advisable.”
223
  Among other things, Busting Bribery stated 
that FCPA reform would “set back decades of progress in the global 
struggle against corruption” and that “FCPA prosecutorial overreach by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) is a myth.”
224
 
Yet Busting Bribery exhibited a poor understanding of how the FCPA 
is actually enforced, an inaccurate view of the FCPA’s legislative history, 
and glaring omissions as to basic corporate criminal liability principles.
225
  
For instance, Busting Bribery asserted, in opposing an FCPA compliance 
defense, that such a defense “makes no sense when, as under the current 
FCPA, corporate criminal liability requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the company acted with actual knowledge and corrupt intent to 
influence a foreign government to gain an improper business advantage.”
226
  
While it is true that the corrupt intent element must be met in order to 
convict a company of an FCPA offense, that corrupt intent element can be 
satisfied, and often is, by singular and isolated acts of any employee, even 
if the employee’s conduct is contrary to preexisting compliance policies 
and procedures.
227
 
 
com/sites/default/files/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf.  Specifically, the Chamber’s FCPA 
proposals are as follows:  “adding a compliance defense; limiting a company’s liability for 
the prior actions of a company it has acquired; adding a ‘willfulness’ requirement for 
corporate criminal liability; limiting a company’s liability for acts of a subsidiary; and 
defining a ‘foreign official’ under the statute.”  See also Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609 (2012) (discussing 
FCPA compliance defense). 
 223.  KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 221, at 8. 
 224.  KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 221, at 5-6. 
 225.  See Mike Koehler, Off-Target, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/off-target (discussing the shortcomings of the Busting 
Bribery report). 
 226.  KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 221, at 6. 
 227.  For instance, the only time in the FCPA’s history that a corporate FCPA charge 
was presented to a jury was in the Lindsey Manufacturing case in 2011.  The relevant jury 
instruction stated as follows:   
To sustain the charge of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(‘“FCPA’”) or violation of the FCPA against Lindsey Manufacturing Company, 
the government must prove the following propositions:  First, the offense 
charged was committed by one or more agents or employees of Lindsey 
Manufacturing Company; Second, in committing the offense, the agent or 
employee intended, at least in part, to benefit Lindsey Manufacturing Company; 
and Third, the acts by the agent or employee were committed within the 
authority or scope of his employment. For an act to be within the authority of an 
agent or the scope of the employment of an employee, it must deal with a matter 
whose performance is generally entrusted to the agent or employee by Lindsey 
Manufacturing Company.  It is not necessary that the particular act was itself 
authorized or directed by Lindsey Manufacturing Company.  If an agent or an 
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What is most striking about many of the opposition pieces written 
about FCPA reform is that while opponents of FCPA reform warn of a U.S. 
retreat on bribery and corruption issues should the FCPA be amended, 
opponents fail to address the fact that an amended FCPA, or revisions to 
FCPA enforcement policy, would actually align the FCPA with the many 
FCPA-like laws or enforcement policies of peer nations.
228
  For instance, 
one FCPA reform proposal is to amend the FCPA to include a compliance 
defense under which a company’s preexisting compliance policies and 
procedures, and its good faith efforts to comply with the FCPA, would be 
relevant as a matter of law when a non-executive employee or agent acts 
contrary to those policies and procedures and in violation of the FCPA.
229
  
Many OECD Convention countries that provide for some form of corporate 
criminal liability in their domestic law (and not all do) have compliance-
like defenses in their domestic FCPA-like law.
230
  In addition, the United 
States is believed to be the only OECD Convention country that uses NPAs 
or DPAs to resolve instances of alleged corporate bribery. 
That the United States enforces the FCPA out-of-step, in many ways, 
with its OECD Convention peer countries was the focus of a December 
2011 white paper released by the International Business Transactions 
Committee of the Bar Association of New York City titled The FCPA and 
Its Impact on International Business Transactions—Should Anything Be 
Done to Minimize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on 
Combating Offshore Corruption (the “New York Bar Report”).
231
  The 
 
employee was acting within the authority or scope of his employment, Lindsey 
Manufacturing Company is not relieved of its responsibility because the act was 
illegal. 
Jury Instructions at 17, United States v. Aguilar Noriega, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal. 
May 6, 2011) (No. 2:10-cr-01031-AHM). 
 228.  The United States is not the only country with a law prohibiting bribery of foreign 
officials for a business purpose.  Thirty-seven other countries (collectively representing two-
thirds of the world’s exports and ninety percent of foreign direct investment) have also 
adopted, like the United States, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”).  Country 
Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en_2649_37447_1933144_1_1_1_37447,00.html 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2012). 
 229.  See Koehler, supra note 222, at 611 (arguing that an FCPA compliance defense 
should be incorporated into the FCPA). 
 230.  See Koehler, supra note 222, at 638-44 (documenting the compliance-like defenses 
available in other OECD member countries). 
 231.  NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS—SHOULD ANYTHING BE DONE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE U.S.’S UNIQUE POSITION ON COMBATING OFFSHORE CORRUPTION? 3 (2011), available 
at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransact 
ions.pdf. 
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New York Bar Report analyzes the FCPA and FCPA enforcement, in part, 
from an economic perspective and explains: 
There are three elements to the current approach to FCPA 
enforcement that are helpful in understanding the costs, risks and 
other constraints that the FCPA places on U.S.-regulated 
companies vis-à-vis their non-U.S. regulated competitors:  (1) the 
U.S. enforcement agencies’ expansive reading of the scope of the 
FCPA (both in terms of conduct and jurisdiction), (2) the limited 
checks on FCPA enforcement (whether judicial or otherwise) and 
(3) the massive size of the potential direct costs (e.g., fines, 
sanctions and defense and compliance costs) and indirect costs 
(e.g., reputational effects and “debarment” from current or future 
government business) of avoiding or defending an actual or 
threatened enforcement action.
232
 
Noting the rise in FCPA enforcement and the “asymmetric approach 
to enforcement” between the U.S. and other OECD Convention countries, 
the New York Bar Report concluded as follows: 
(1) the United States has pursued, and is currently pursuing, a 
virtually stand-alone approach to deterring foreign 
corruption, . . . (2) this approach places significant costs on 
companies that are subject to the FCPA as compared to their 
competitors that are not, . . . and, (3) if these circumstances are 
unlikely to change, . . . the United States should reevaluate its 
approach to the problem of foreign corruption.
233
 
The report stated, among other things, that the “continued unilateral 
and zealous enforcement of the FCPA by the United States may not be the 
most effective means to combat corruption globally—in fact, in some 
circumstances it may exacerbate the problem of overseas corruption.”
234
 
CONCLUSION 
The New York Bar Report concluded as follows:  “While the task is 
daunting and the discomfort of admitting that the current approach has 
significant flaws is unavoidable, that does not mean that action should not 
be taken.”
235
  This is a fitting end as well to this Article, which analyzed 
notable enforcement trends from the past year and chronicled the most 
intense year of public scrutiny in the FCPA’s history.  These trends and this 
 
 232.  Id. at 3, 15. 
 233.  Id. at 3. 
 234.  Id. at 23. 
 235.  Id. at 25. 
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scrutiny demonstrate that as the FCPA’s thirty-fifth year approaches, basic 
legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope and 
effectiveness of the FCPA. 
 
